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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENSES 
Gideon Parchomovsky* & Alex Stein** 
This Article demonstrates that all intellectual property defenses fit 
into three conceptual categories: general, individualized, and class defe-
nses. A general defense challenges the validity of the plaintiff’s intel-
lectual property right. When raised successfully, it annuls the plaintiff’s 
right and relieves not only the defendant, but also the entire world, of the 
duty to comply with it. An individualized defense is much narrower in 
scope: Its successful showing defeats the specific infringement claim 
asserted by the plaintiff, but leaves the plaintiff’s right intact. Class 
defenses form an in-between category: They create an immunity zone for 
a certain group of users to which the defendant belongs, without nul-
lifying the plaintiff’s right.  
The Article then shows that society has a special interest in the suc-
cessful raising of class and general defenses. These defenses eliminate the 
unneeded intellectual property protection and thereby facilitate inno-
vation, creativity, and competition. However, because defendants do not 
capture the full social benefit associated with class and general defenses, 
their investment in such defenses falls below the socially optimal level. 
To remedy this problem, the Article proposes that defendants who 
raise class or general defenses be allowed to implead other potential 
defendants. To this end, it develops two mechanisms: “preclusion” and 
“restitution.” Both mechanisms permit impleaded parties to decline the 
invitation to join, but attach a consequence to the refusal. Under the 
preclusion mechanism, parties who choose to opt out would be barred 
from raising any general or class defense that was unsuccessfully 
asserted by the original defendant, if sued by the same plaintiff. The rest-
itution mechanism imposes no procedural bars on the parties selecting to 
opt out. Instead, it requires them to pay the defendant a fair share of her 
litigation costs should she prevail on a class or general defense as they, 
too, benefit from her effort. The Article ultimately endorses the restitution 
mechanism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article devises a meta-theory of defenses in intellectual property 
law. A meta-theory is important not only to legal theorists, but, first and 
foremost, to lawmakers. As will be shown in the pages ahead, different 
intellectual property defenses have radically different impacts on owners 
and users of intellectual assets. Legislators must be mindful of this fact 
when enacting new defenses and determining the conditions for raising 
them. Courts, for their part, must also be aware of the commonalities 
and differences among various defenses in interpreting them and deter-
mining their applicability and scope in individual cases.  
This Article posits that all intellectual property defenses fall into 
three categories: general defenses, individualized defenses, and class 
defenses. General defenses challenge the very essence of the plaintiff’s 
right. Examples include merger of idea and expression in copyright law,1 
obviousness in patent law,2 and genericide in trademark law.3 A general 
defense, when raised successfully, has implications that go well beyond 
the case at hand. A successful general defense decides not only the fate 
of the individual defendant who raised it, but also the rights and obli-
gations of multiple potential defendants who could be sued by the 
                                                                                                                                         
1. See infra Part I.A (enumerating and categorizing copyright defenses).  
2. See infra Part I.B (categorizing patent law defenses). 
3. See infra Part I.C (discussing trademark claims and defenses).  
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plaintiff in the future. Conceptually, a general defense is the inverse of a 
right in rem. A right in rem is a right that avails against the rest of the 
world, whereas a general defense negates the right vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world, leaving the plaintiff empty-handed.4  
The effect of individualized defenses, by contrast, is limited to the 
case at bar. An individualized defense creates a limited immunity zone 
for the individual defendant who raises it successfully, while leaving the 
plaintiff’s entitlement against the rest of the world intact.5 An individ-
ualized defense helps only the defendant sued for a violation of the 
plaintiff’s right. Absence of consumer confusion under trademark law, 
independent creation or lack of substantial similarity in copyright law, 
and a claim that a later invention does not come within the claims of an 
earlier patent are all examples of individualized defenses. A successful 
showing of an individualized defense helps the defendant defeat the suit 
against her, but does not nullify the plaintiff’s entitlement. Hence, even 
after the loss, the plaintiff will be able to assert his right against other 
individuals and corporations. Conceptually, therefore, individualized 
defenses may be thought of as the inverse of in personam rights, rights 
that avail only against a particular individual.6  
                                                                                                                                         
4. As rights in rem, intellectual property rights are rights that avail against the rest of 
the world. See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in 
Judicial Reasoning, 26 Yale L.J. 710, 718–20 (1917) (defining right in rem as “availing 
respectively against persons constituting a very large and indefinite class of people” 
(emphasis omitted)). A defendant who successfully challenges an intellectual property 
right by establishing a general defense removes the compliance burden not only from 
herself, but also from all other members of our society. For the procedural side of this 
principle, see In re Cygnus Telecomms. Tech., LLC, Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1343, 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“It is a firmly established principle that a judgment of a patent invalidity 
in one case can collaterally estop the patent owner from contesting invalidity in a 
subsequent case, as long as the patent owner had a ‘full and fair opportunity to litigate the 
validity of the patent’ . . . .” (quoting Miss. Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric. Chems. Corp., 717 
F.2d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (citing Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. 
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 (1971))). 
5. A court’s analysis of an individualized defense can produce valuable information 
about the nature and boundaries of the plaintiff’s right. For example, a court weighing the 
question of consumer confusion in a trademark infringement case may classify the 
plaintiff’s mark as descriptive (with secondary meaning), suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 
This information can be important for third parties, but it does not negate the plaintiff’s 
right or relieve future defendants of the duty to respect it. For legal mechanisms that elicit 
this information, see generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 719 (2009); Peter S. Menell, Promoting Patent Claim Clarity (UC Berkeley 
Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2171287, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2171
287 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). For analysis of patent and copyright rules as 
reducing observers’ cost of verifying the underlying intellectual property rights, see Clarisa 
Long, Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 Va. L. Rev. 465, 480 (2004); Clarisa 
Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 625, 668–71 (2002). 
6. See Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 718–20 (distinguishing between rights in rem and 
rights in personam).  
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There is also a third, smaller, in-between category: class defenses. 
Unlike general defenses that have the potential to negate the right 
asserted by the plaintiff, and individualized defenses that do not impact 
the plaintiff’s right against any future defendants, class defenses, when 
successful, block claims against a specified class of defendants. Fair use, 
as applied to parodies under copyright law, is a paradigmatic example of 
a class defense. Fair use is often invoked as an individualized defense 
against a particular infringement claim. At other times, however, it sets 
up a categorical bar against certain infringement claims, thereby 
protecting a specified class of defendants. There is a shared under-
standing among copyright scholars and practitioners that fair use affords 
parodists a legal safe harbor. As a result, a defendant who successfully 
invokes a parody defense in a copyright infringement action shields 
future parodists against similar suits.7 Class defenses can be thought of as 
the conceptual mirror image of quasi-property rights. As the Supreme 
Court famously explained in International News Service v. Associated Press, 
quasi-property rights are rights that avail only against direct competitors.8 
In a similar vein, class defenses protect the entire trade to which the 
defendant belongs—in this example, parodists. 
The classification proposed herein highlights a critical difference 
between general defenses (and to a lesser degree, class defenses) and 
individualized defenses. The benefit of an individualized defense accrues 
exclusively to the defendant who raises it. In other words, the defend-
ant’s victory does not change the legal status of other potential defend-
ants.9 The same is obviously true of the cost. Thus, in the case of indi-
vidualized defenses, a defendant fully internalizes the cost and benefit of 
raising a particular defense. The case of general and class defenses is pro-
foundly different. A defendant who successfully raises a general defense 
bestows a benefit on society at large by invalidating an intellectual prop-
erty right that should not exist from a legal standpoint. For example, a 
defendant who shows that the plaintiff’s work lacks the requisite level of 
                                                                                                                                         
7. See infra notes 13–15, 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing parody defense 
cases). Another class defense is time shifting. This defense becomes available as part of the 
fair use doctrine when a noncommercial viewer of a broadcast television show records the 
show with her VCR to watch it later. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 447–56 (1984) (explaining noncommercial time shifting falls under fair use 
doctrine). By establishing this defense, the viewer makes it permissible for other 
noncommercial viewers—also identified as personal users—to copy the show. For a recent 
analysis of this defense, see Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and 
the Personal Use Dilemma, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2067, 2086–92 (2012). 
8. 248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918). For an excellent analysis of the “quasi-property” concept 
and justification for its use in the International News Service decision, see Shyamkrishna 
Balganesh, “Hot News”: The Enduring Myth of Property in News, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 419, 
429–38 (2011). 
9. We acknowledge that individualized defenses can yield limited informational 
benefits to third parties, which stem from the fact that courts in assessing the merits of an 
individualized defense must often analyze the scope and nature of the plaintiff’s 
intellectual property right. 
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originality and is therefore ineligible for copyright protection eliminates 
the threat of copyright liability not only for herself, but also for the rest 
of the world.10 In Hohfeldian terms, intellectual property rights are rights 
in rem that avail against the rest of the world.11 And as Wesley Newcomb 
Hohfeld famously pointed out, these rights impose a duty of compliance 
on each member of society at large.12 A defendant who successfully 
challenges an intellectual property right through a general defense 
therefore alleviates the burden of compliance not only from herself, but 
also from all other members of society. Removal of this burden opens up 
valuable economic opportunities for multiple creators. 
For the same reason, a defendant who succeeds at establishing a 
class defense benefits an entire class of similarly situated defendants. In 
this case, the social benefits may be more limited in scope as they only 
accrue to a particular group of people. Yet here too there exists a sub-
stantial misalignment between the defendant’s and other creators’ 
benefits. Consider the case of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., which 
established the parody defense in our copyright law.13 There, the defend-
ants alone shouldered the burden of litigating the case all the way to the 
Supreme Court and of persuading the Court to recognize the defense.14 
Yet the benefit from the defendants’ success accrued to all creators of 
parodies.15 
From an economic perspective, general and class defenses create a 
positive spillover effect for society. And while society as a whole benefits 
from the defendant’s litigation effort, the defendant alone bears the cost 
of vindicating the claims. Economic theory suggests that goods and 
services that give rise to such positive externalities will be underproduced 
in society.16 General and class defenses provide a perfect example.  
To see why, imagine a defendant, Dale, who is sued for patent 
infringement by a large corporation. Dale is certain that the patent as-
serted against her is invalid for lack of novelty. After all, about 50% of all 
                                                                                                                                         
10. This example draws on Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 
U.S. 340 (1991), the Supreme Court’s decision that the listings in the appellee’s telephone 
directory failed to meet the requisite “originality” threshold and were therefore not 
entitled to copyright protection. As a result, beyond the appellant, every third party 
acquired the liberty to copy the listings in the appellee’s directory. 
11. See Hohfeld, supra note 4, at 718–20. In Hohfeldian terms, a right may avail 
against a large, indefinite group of individuals rather than the world at large and still be 
considered a right in rem. 
12. Id.  
13. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
14. Id. at 572–74. 
15. See infra notes 49–52 and accompanying text (discussing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music and case’s impact on future parody claims). 
16. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property, and Positive 
Externalities, 54 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 228–36 (2012) (explaining why economic 
efficiency goal calls for internalization of positive externalities). 
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patents are invalidated by courts.17 However, to prove her claim in court 
would cost her $500,000 while she can settle the case out of court for 
$100,000. Should Dale choose to litigate, she may spare multiple other 
defendants from facing her dilemma. The aggregate benefit to those 
parties may be in the millions of dollars. Yet, if Dale is a rational self-
interest maximizer, she will choose to settle the case and pay $100,000 to 
the holder of the invalid patent. The large benefit to other potential 
defendants and their innovative technological pursuits will not be part of 
her calculus. 
At this point, one might interject and argue that when a patent 
holder chooses to litigate, he runs the risk of losing his intellectual asset 
and hence there is symmetry between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s 
bargaining positions. This symmetry, so goes the argument, will motivate 
the parties to settle the lawsuit for its expected value (or a close 
amount).18 The symmetry is illusory, though. The rightsholder is 
endowed with the power to decide against whom to enforce his right. 
Furthermore, he can discontinue the litigation process at almost any 
point. In short, in our legal system plaintiffs enjoy an inherent first-mover 
advantage. As a result, plaintiffs can target defendants that do not have 
the financial wherewithal to face them in court, or worse, defendants 
who cannot afford the high cost of litigation and would fold in court. 
Doing so allows plaintiffs to secure favorable results in litigation that faci-
litate subsequent enforcement efforts.19 A patent, a copyright, or a trade-
mark that was “upheld” in litigation can be then asserted against other 
users with more gusto.20 If, for some reason, a plaintiff errs in his assess-
                                                                                                                                         
17. See John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and 
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 Geo. L.J. 677, 680 (2011) (“Once-litigated 
patents win in court almost 50% of the time, while the most-litigated—and putatively most 
valuable—patents win in court only 10.7% of the time.”); Carl Shapiro, Patent System 
Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1017, 1028 (2004) 
(“[T]he probability that a patent will hold up under court challenge has risen over time, 
reaching just over 50 percent in the more recent period . . . .” (citing Nat’l Acad. of Scis., 
A Patent System for the 21st Century 48–49 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004))). 
18. Cf. Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 
Geo. L.J. 637, 650 (2013) (explaining when valid patent owners are forced into court, 
“[n]ot only are the costs of litigation and the risks of improper invalidation significant; 
they can also exert a differential impact on some of the most important and vulnerable 
patent holders”). 
19. See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive 
Intellectual Property Litigation, 44 B.C. L. Rev. 509, 521–25 (2003) (describing 
exclusionary litigation and predatory litigation as strategies employed by plaintiffs seeking 
favorable results); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, The Relational 
Contingency of Rights, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1313, 1345–52 (2012) [hereinafter Parchomovsky & 
Stein, Relational Contingency] (explaining how large firms with economies of scale and 
discounted litigation expenditures can exploit their superiority and have upper hand in 
both trial and settlement against defendants with no economies of scale who must pay 
more for legal representation). 
20. Plaintiffs’ tendency to overvalue their intellectual property will often strengthen 
their incentive to sue. See Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Jon Sprigman, The 
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ment of a potential defendant who turns out to be more financially 
capable or principled than the plaintiff estimated, the plaintiff can always 
drop the case and target another user. 
Contemporary research, both empirical and theoretical,21 has 
demonstrated that problematic abuse of intellectual property rights 
looms large and is becoming increasingly acute.22 Against this backdrop 
comes the normative contribution of this Article. The Article proposes 
two innovative mechanisms designed to increase the power of defendants 
who wish to raise general or class defenses. We argue that the law should 
endow defendants who raise a general or class defense with the power to 
implead as codefendants other similarly situated parties. This power 
would enable critical cost sharing among defendants, with each party 
shouldering a relatively small fraction of the aggregate cost of 
establishing the defense.  
The rationale behind this proposal is straightforward. All potential 
defendants face the risk of being sued by intellectual property holders. 
The order in which they may be sued is not known to them ex ante and 
depends entirely on the plaintiff’s strategic selection. An individual 
defendant would typically be unable to fend off the litigation threat 
singlehandedly. As explained, a plaintiff can adopt a clever “divide and 
conquer” strategy and defeat the chosen defendants one by one. 
Together, the potential defendants may stand a good chance of 
prevailing in the litigation. However, they face a collective action prob-
lem: Each defendant prefers that someone other than himself bear the 
high cost of waging full legal battle against the plaintiff. This Article’s 
proposals mitigate this problem by allowing each defendant to consol-
idate the pool of potential defendants and mount a strong legal defense 
collectively. 
Specifically, the Article develops two innovative alternatives to 
advance the voluntary joinder of defendants: (1) the preclusion mech-
anism and (2) the restitution mechanism. Under the preclusion 
mechanism, each defendant who raises a general or class defense would 
be given the power to implead similarly situated defendants: those who 
are, or might be, accused of infringing the underlying intellectual prop-
erty entitlement. The impleaded defendants would be able to opt out 
instead of joining in, but if the class or general defense asserted by the 
actual defendant fails, they would be precluded from asserting that 
defense in their future litigation against the same plaintiff. The proposed 
                                                                                                                                         
Creativity Effect, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 31, 36–41 (2011) (demonstrating through experiment 
that owners tend to put excessive value on their intellectual property assets). 
21. See, e.g., Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, Stan. Tech. L. 
Rev., Jan. 9, 2012, at 1, 23–25, http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/feldman-giants-among-us.pdf 
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting and analyzing strategic abuse of 
patent rights by mass aggregators of patents).  
22. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1349–50, 
and sources cited therein. 
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procedural bar would incentivize impleaded defendants to join the initial 
defendant and face the infringement suit together.  
Alternatively, we consider the adoption of a restitution-based mech-
anism. Under this mechanism, impleaded parties would be at liberty not 
to join the litigation. However, in the event the defendant’s class or 
general defense is successful, parties who opted out of the litigation 
would have to pay their fair share of the cost of raising the defense as 
they, too, benefited from the effort. In the case of failure, the parties who 
opted out would have to pay nothing. After a careful weighing of the 
pros and cons of each alternative in Part III, we emerge with a slight 
preference for the restitution mechanism.  
To illustrate how the proposed mechanisms would work, assume that 
Motorola sues a small manufacturer of cellphone equipment for a patent 
and trade-dress infringement. The small manufacturer has a promising 
general defense against the suit. Under extant law, however, she is left to 
her own devices. Under our proposal, she would be able to invite other 
cellphone manufacturers, including Apple, Nokia, and Samsung, to join 
the suit as defendants. The invited parties would be at liberty to decline 
the invitation. However, they would be subject to the proposed pre-
clusion and restitution mechanisms. Under the preclusion mechanism, 
parties who declined the invitation to join as codefendants would be 
barred from relitigating the class and general defenses raised by the 
small manufacturer. Under the restitution mechanism, if the manu-
facturer prevailed on a class or general defense, she would be entitled to 
collect from those parties who passed up the invitation to be 
codefendants a prorated share of her expenses plus a premium repre-
senting the risk she bore on their behalf.23  
By changing the payoff matrix that is currently associated with liti-
gation and enhancing the attractiveness of cooperation relative to 
defection,24 these two mechanisms go a long way toward countering the 
inherent advantage enjoyed by plaintiffs and leveling the litigation play-
field.  
It is important to understand that the adoption of this Article’s 
proposals would affect not only the way cases proceed in court, but also, 
and more pervasively, the rightsholders’ decisions to file suits and other-
wise enforce their entitlements. This proposal would eliminate many of 
the strike suits that are currently initiated by plaintiffs who take 
advantage of asymmetrical litigation costs.25 Lowering the threat of strike 
suits would lead to wider use of technologies and expressive works and, 
                                                                                                                                         
23. For a detailed account of the restitution proposal, see infra Part III.B.  
24. For “cooperation/defection” taxonomy, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of 
Cooperation 7–8 (rev. ed. 2006). 
25. Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the 
Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to Be Revised, 14 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 519, 556 
(1999) (describing “strike suit” phenomenon in copyright). 
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as importantly, would reduce the drag of intellectual property rights on 
future innovation and expression.26  
Structurally, this Article proceeds as follows. Part I develops a new 
taxonomy of intellectual property defenses organized around the cate-
gories of general, individualized, and class defenses. In this Part, we set 
forth the defining characteristics of each category and devise a compre-
hensive mapping of all intellectual property defenses. Part II addresses 
the special challenge presented by general and class defenses by 
analyzing them through the lens of the economic theory of positive ex-
ternalities. Furthermore, this Part discusses the cost to society from 
“underproduction” of class and especially general defenses. Part III 
introduces two novel procedural mechanisms designed to encourage 
defendants to raise and litigate general and class defenses. These mech-
anisms will give defendants sued for violations of intellectual property 
rights the power to implead potential future defendants and thus spread 
the cost of defense over multiple actors. As shown herein, this proposal 
enjoys the twin advantages of simplicity and practical implementability. 
Part IV raises and responds to possible objections to this proposal. A 
short Conclusion ensues. 
I. MAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENSES 
In this Part, we set out to map the terrain of intellectual property 
defenses. We demonstrate that all defenses to intellectual property 
infringement claims may be divided into three broad types: individ-
ualized defenses, class defenses, and general defenses. All three types can 
be used to defeat infringement claims. Critically, though, they vary in 
their effect on third parties. Individualized defenses have a minimal or 
no effect on third parties. A defendant who successfully asserts an indi-
vidualized defense—say, independent creation in a copyright infringe-
ment suit—bestows no real benefit, in terms of legal rights or privileges, 
on other users of the copyrighted work. The plaintiff can continue to 
assert her copyright against third parties and file lawsuits against them in 
appropriate cases. The defendant’s victory does not narrow the scope of 
her right and, clearly, does not erase it. To be sure, individualized 
defenses may—and do—generate information spillovers for third 
parties.27 For example, if a defendant in a patent infringement suit claims 
that she did not infringe any of the patentee’s claims, the court would 
have to construct the claims invoked by the patentee in order to evaluate 
                                                                                                                                         
26. See infra notes 172–174 and accompanying text (showing defendants in 
intellectual property disputes generally have little incentive to litigate due to asymmetric 
costs). 
27. Cf. Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in 
Corporate Law, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1908, 1927–39 (1998) (arguing Delaware Chancery 
Court produces beneficial interpretive externalities for firms choosing to incorporate in 
Delaware and be governed by Delaware’s corporate law). 
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the defense. The construction of the claims may, no doubt, prove valu-
able for third parties, as it clarifies the boundaries of the patent. But it 
does not change the legal status of third parties vis-à-vis the patent 
holder. For these third parties, the impact of the court’s decision is more 
information, not more rights. 
The effect of class defenses is different. A successful class defense 
changes the legal status not only of the defendant who raised it, but also 
of similarly situated individuals or firms. Consider, for example, a 
defendant in a trade secrecy infringement case who argues that the info-
rmation the employer-plaintiff claims as a trade secret falls in the cate-
gory of unprotected “general skills.”28 If successful, this defendant would 
help not only herself, but also an entire class of employees that could 
have been sued on the same grounds in the future. By having the 
“general skills” defense upheld by the court, the defendant unlocks gain-
ful opportunities for all of those employees. Or consider a defendant in a 
trademark infringement case who proves that the plaintiff’s mark is 
descriptive and has not yet acquired secondary meaning.29 Here, too, a 
benefit accrues to a whole class of businesses that use a mark that is 
similar to that of the plaintiff and, owing to the defendant’s success, will 
be able to continue to use their marks.  
General defenses change the status of intellectual property holders 
vis-à-vis the entire world. These defenses affect the very existence of the 
right asserted in a particular case. Thus, when a general defense is 
asserted successfully, it means that the intellectual property right with 
respect to which it was raised ceases to exist. To illustrate this effect, 
consider a defendant in a patent infringement case who demonstrates 
that an invention is obvious to a person skilled in the relevant art, or a 
defendant in a copyright infringement case who argues that an ex-
pressive work is not original. In both cases, the defendant’s victory extin-
guishes the plaintiff’s legal asset: the intellectual property right on which 
the case was predicated. And since intellectual property rights avail 
against the rest of the world, the meaning of that victory is that the rest of 
the world is now relieved of the legal duty to respect the plaintiff’s patent 
or copyright. The defendant’s victory affects not only those individuals 
who otherwise may have been sued by the plaintiff for acts they have 
committed in the past, but also multiple future actors.  
The proceeding discussion will apply the new taxonomy of defenses 
across all areas of intellectual property. We will partition the entire 
universe of intellectual property defenses into the categories of indi-
                                                                                                                                         
28. See infra notes 151–152 and accompanying text (showing employees are 
permitted to transfer general skills and knowledge from one job to another). 
29. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (“To 
establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, 
the primary significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the 
product rather than the product itself.”).  
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vidualized, class, and general defenses. We begin our conceptual foray 
with the defenses available under copyright law. Subsequently, we move 
to discuss defenses in patent law, and then proceed to trademark law. We 
conclude with trade secrecy defenses. 
A. Copyright Law 
Individualized defenses in copyright law include independent 
creation,30 copying of unprotected elements,31 lack of substantial simi-
larity,32 and, in some cases, fair use.33 Each of these defenses relieves a 
defendant from liability for copyright infringement without affecting the 
legal status of third parties. The independent creation defense provides a 
helpful illustration. In contrast to patent law, where similarity alone is the 
touchstone of liability,34 copyright law also requires unlawful copying.35 
                                                                                                                                         
30. See Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological Age 
439 (6th ed. 2012) [hereinafter Merges et al., Intellectual Property] (outlining scope of 
independent creation defense). 
31. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“[T]he party claiming infringement may place ‘no reliance upon any similarity in 
expression resulting from’ unprotectable elements.” (emphasis added by Apple Computer) 
(quoting Aliotti v. R. Dakin & Co., 831 F.2d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 1987))); Alexander v. Haley, 
460 F. Supp. 40, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding no substantial similarity between protectable, 
as opposed to unprotectable, elements of plaintiff’s novel and defendant’s book); see also 
Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1505, 1514 (2009) 
[hereinafter Parchomovsky & Stein, Originality] (explaining plaintiff in copyright 
infringement suit must prove “defendant borrowed protected elements from her work” 
and this proof “is necessary to ensure that the similarity between the two works is not due 
to the presence of the same unprotected elements in both works”). 
32. See David Nimmer, An Odyssey Through Copyright’s Vicarious Defenses, 73 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 162, 175 (1998) (calling “lack of substantial similarity” a classic defense in 
copyright suits); Parchomovsky & Stein, Originality, supra note 31, at 1513 (attesting lack 
of similarity between protected and unprotected works dooms copyright owner’s suit). 
33. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 609–10, 618–22 
(outlining scope of fair use defense). 
34. Patent infringement includes any development of a product or technological 
process during the term of the patent that falls within the scope of the patent’s claims. 
See, e.g., Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (explaining 
patent infringements “rest on allegations that the defendant ‘without authority ma[de], 
use[d] or [sold the] patented invention, within the United States during the term of the 
patent therefor’” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994))). Compare Samson Vermont, 
Independent Invention as a Defense to Patent Infringement, 105 Mich. L. Rev. 475, 484–
87 (2006) (arguing patent infringement should incorporate proof of copying from patent 
holder), with Mark A. Lemley, Should Patent Infringement Require Proof of Copying?, 
105 Mich. L. Rev. 1525, 1529 (2007) (arguing, inter alia, that recognition of independent 
invention defense, advocated by Vermont, would chill expensive research and 
development by reducing entrepreneurs’ probability of recouping their investment). 
35. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946) (setting forth classic 
formulation of two-step analysis, which considers both copying and unlawful 
appropriation); Parchomovsky & Stein, Originality, supra note 31, at 1513–14 (“To 
succeed in an infringement suit, a plaintiff needs to show copying and improper 
appropriation by the defendant.”). 
1494 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 113:1483 
  
If, perchance, a person independently creates a work that is identical to a 
preexisting work, she will not be liable for copyright infringement.36 
Rather, both works would be entitled to copyright protection. The inde-
pendent creation defense helps the individual defendant who raises it, 
but has no effect whatsoever on the rights and powers of the copyright 
holder vis-à-vis third parties. Moreover, it does not create information 
spillovers for third parties.  
Another important copyright doctrine that falls in the category of 
individualized defenses is the idea-expression dichotomy. As section 
102(a) of the Copyright Act makes clear, copyright protection extends to 
the original expression of the plaintiff as it was fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression, but not to the ideas underlying the expression.37 
The idea-expression divide has a venerable history,38 and it continues to 
be a ground principle of our copyright system. Under this principle, only 
appropriation of protected expression is actionable; ideas remain free for 
the taking. Hence, a defendant can fend off a copyright infringement 
case by showing that all she copied were unprotected ideas.39 Doing so 
will help the defendant prevail against the plaintiff, and may even gener-
ate valuable information for future litigants. However, it will not bar the 
copyright owner from instituting legal actions against other individuals 
who use his work. These users would then have to establish their own 
defenses—individualized, class, or general.  
Ideas are by no means the only elements that can be taken with 
impunity. Other unprotected elements that can be used freely by third 
parties include facts,40 public domain materials,41 and “scenes a faire.”42 
Facts are treated similarly to ideas and hence their appropriation does 
not trigger liability under our copyright system. Courts have consistently 
ruled that facts and historical research can be taken by others. Hence, if 
                                                                                                                                         
36. See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (“Proof of copying is 
crucial to any claim of copyright infringement because no matter how similar the two 
works may be (even to the point of identity), if the defendant did not copy the accused 
work, there is no infringement.”). 
37. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012); see also § 102(b) (“In no case does copyright 
protection extend to any idea . . . regardless of the form in which it is described . . . in such 
work.”). 
38. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1879) (establishing idea-
expression dichotomy). 
39. Id. at 102 (“[T]here is a clear distinction between the book, as such, and the art 
which it is intended to illustrate. . . . [N]o one would contend that the copyright of the 
treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or manufacture described therein.”). 
40. See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356 (1991) 
(holding while facts are not copyrightable per se, compilations of facts may be). 
41. See Edward Samuels, The Public Domain in Copyright Law, 41 J. Copyright Soc’y 
U.S.A. 137, 151–54 (1993) (discussing how copyrighted material enters public domain 
through expiration or forfeiture of copyright). 
42. See, e.g., Leslie A. Kurtz, Copyright: The Scenes a Faire Doctrine, 41 Fla. L. Rev. 
79, 86–96 (1989) (arguing “scenes a faire” have traditionally been impossible to protect). 
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a defendant can demonstrate that she took only facts and historical 
research, she will be sheltered from liability.43 The “scenes a faire” 
defense denies protection to stock elements, such as yellow taxi cabs in a 
novel that takes place in New York City or bay views in a film about a love 
affair in San Francisco. Naturally, copyright protection does not extend 
to public domain materials that may be used freely. Oftentimes, the use 
of facts, “scenes a faire,” or public domain materials may result in simi-
larity between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works. Copyright 
holders use the similarity between the works to construct a prima facie 
case against defendants. Similarity between the copyrighted work and the 
allegedly infringing creation constitutes prima facie evidence of 
infringement. However, courts stop short of assigning liability when the 
similarity is due to the use of unprotected elements in both works. A 
ruling favoring the defendant in all those cases is both doctrinally correct 
and socially desirable, but it does not affect parties not participating in 
the litigation. Such outsiders can find valuable information in the court’s 
ruling—namely, information about the boundaries of the plaintiff’s 
right—but the ruling itself does not relieve them of the duty to respect 
the plaintiff’s right.  
The fair use doctrine is yet another example of an individualized 
defense. Originating in equity, fair use is an affirmative defense against 
copyright infringement actions. In adjudicating fair use claims, courts are 
required to consider: (1) the purpose of the defendant’s use; (2) the 
nature of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality appropriated by the defendant in relation to the work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the unauthorized use on the market for the 
plaintiff’s work.44 Ultimately, fair use remains “an equitable rule of 
reason”45 and its application varies based on the particular facts of each 
individual case.46 Accordingly, a successful showing of fair use allows the 
defendant to keep using the plaintiff’s protected expression without 
payment. However, in the typical case, the defendant’s success does not 
help other potential users of the copyrighted work. As one commentator 
noted, it is unlikely that “the results in concrete cases can be made pre-
dictably responsive to a limited set of definite principles—certainly not 
large, general principles and not very often even more specific, inter-
mediate ones.”47 
                                                                                                                                         
43. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1370–71 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(explaining historical research and facts are not copyrightable); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. 
Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 309–10 (2d Cir. 1966) (same). 
44. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
45. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448 & n.31 
(1984). 
46. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 552 (1985) 
(“[F]air use analysis must always be tailored to the individual case.”). 
47. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1137, 1138 (1990). 
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Copyright law recognizes a number of class defenses as well. As we 
just noted, fair use is frequently asserted as an individualized defense, but 
in at least one context it constitutes a class defense under our taxon-
omy.48 In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Supreme Court ruled that 
parodists have an especially strong claim for fair use.49 Furthermore, the 
Court explained how the statutory factors should be weighed in parody 
cases. Lower courts endorsed the message and have applied the ruling 
consistently.50 The result was the creation of a safe harbor for parodies.51 
In our terminology, parodists, as a class, are virtually immune from copy-
right liability. The defendants in Campbell did not merely transform their 
own legal status into noninfringing. They did so for the entire class of 
parodists to which they belonged, bestowing a substantial economic 
benefit on all the other class members.52 
Another example of a class defense is the technological safe harbor 
established by the Supreme Court in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc.53 In that landmark decision, the Supreme Court ruled that a 
technology provider does not assume derivative (or secondary) liability 
for infringements committed by users of the technology—in that case, a 
video cassette recorder—when the technology is “capable of substantial 
noninfringing use.”54 The decision constituted a victory not only for 
Sony, the actual defendant, but also for the entire technological sector. It 
                                                                                                                                         
48. Professor Jason Mazzone recently proposed the establishment of a new agency for 
protecting fair use. See Jason Mazzone, Copyfraud and Other Abuses of Intellectual 
Property Law 189–92 (2011). Adoption of this proposal would likely lead to a 
recharacterization of fair use into a class, or even general, defense. This proposal, 
however, engenders a twin problem of agency capture and costly bureaucracy. For 
discussion of this problem, see Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright Reform Possible?, 126 
Harv. L. Rev. 740, 763 (2013) (reviewing Mazzone, supra). 
49. 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994). 
50. See, e.g., Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 335 F.3d 1161, 
1165 (10th Cir. 2003) (attesting parody generally constitutes fair use after Campbell, 510 
U.S. 569); Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 518 (7th Cir. 2002) (same); Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2001) (same). 
51. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 Va. L. Rev. 
1483, 1526 (2007) (discussing parodies’ relative immunity from liability). 
52. For other potential applications of fair use as a class defense, see Yochai Benkler, 
The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and Freedom 389 
(2006) (arguing investigative journalists can claim fair use when publishing materials not 
intended for sale that carry high public value); Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand 
Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 683, 754 (2012) (attesting Copyright 
Office recently recognized video remix as fair use after accepting artists’ position that 
“high-quality reproductions are often necessary to make critical points”). For a powerful 
normative claim in that direction, see Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses 
Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity 294–96 (2004). 
53. 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
54. Id. at 442. 
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had a profound effect on all producers of video recorders,55 as well as on 
numerous manufacturers of other technological devices.56  
Finally, copyright law contains several general defenses as well. 
Consider the merger doctrine that applies in cases in which there is only 
a limited number of ways to express an idea.57 In such cases, by the doc-
trine’s operation, the expressions merge with the idea and copyright pro-
tection is withheld altogether.58 A defendant who successfully raises a 
merger defense consequently helps not only herself, but also the public 
as a whole. The merger defense targets the very existence of the plain-
tiff’s copyright. Hence, when a court finds for the defendant on merger 
grounds, the plaintiff loses not only the case, but also the very right he 
asserted.  
A similar result is obtained when a defendant, in response to an 
infringement suit, successfully argues that the plaintiff’s copyright should 
not have existed ab initio as his work lacks the requisite level of origi-
nality or a modicum of creativity. Indeed, “[o]riginality is the sine qua 
non of copyright protection.”59 The Copyright Act makes it clear that 
protection is reserved only for original works of authorship.60 
                                                                                                                                         
55. See Jennifer 8. Lee, Digital Video Recorders: First, Replay TV 4000 Must Face the 
Courts, N.Y. Times, Dec. 31, 2001, at C3 (noting makers of digital video recorders made 
sure their devices were capable of “substantial noninfringing uses”). 
56. This effect was evidenced by the following fact: Twenty-one years later, when the 
Supreme Court revisited its ruling in the Sony case, multiple groups filed amicus briefs 
calling on the Court not to overturn Sony. See Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of 
Innovation, 31 Cardozo L. Rev. 2257, 2268 n.51 (2010) (reviewing amici briefs filed in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)). The Court 
ultimately narrowed the scope of fair use by ruling that the Sony safe harbor would be 
suspended in cases of inducement. This decision, however, did not efface the defense 
completely. See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934–37 (holding distributor of device liable for 
resulting acts of infringement by third parties when distribution was done with view to 
promoting copyright infringement). 
57. For one such scenario, see Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121–
22 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding author of play “Abie’s Irish Rose” had no ownership over 
general idea of difficult coexistence between Irish and Jewish families whose children 
marry each other, and thus subsequent motion picture, “The Cohens and The Kellys,” was 
free to use idea). As Judge Learned Hand aptly explained:  
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of patterns of 
increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left 
out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of what 
the play is about, and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point 
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from their 
expression, his property is never extended. 
Id. at 121 (citing Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82, 86 (1899); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694, 
696 (2d Cir. 1929)).  
58. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Originality, supra note 31, at 1537–38, and sources 
cited therein (discussing copyright protection under merger doctrine). 
59. Id. at 1505–06.  
60. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
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Accordingly, a defendant can effectively deflect an infringement claim by 
showing that the plaintiff’s work is unoriginal. In Feist, the Supreme 
Court interpreted the originality standard to require a modicum of crea-
tivity.61 Applying this interpretation, the Court struck down the copyright 
in the listings in the appellee’s telephone directory.62 The implication of 
a finding that the plaintiff’s work is insufficiently original or creative is 
that any party, not just the actual defendant, can make use of the 
expression contained in the work.  
Copyright misuse is the final example of a general copyright 
defense. As Professor Thomas Cotter explained, the misuse defense 
requires the defendant to prove that the “copyright plaintiff has 
attempted to broaden the scope of her intellectual property rights . . . 
with an anticompetitive effect.”63 The copyright misuse defense was in-
voked by licensees and third parties in several recent cases involving vio-
lations of copyrights in software.64 In cases in which the defendant 
successfully proves copyright misuse, the court typically enters judgment 
that the copyright is unenforceable until the misuse is purged.65 In other 
words, a successful showing of copyright misuse results in a temporary 
halt on or permanent invalidation of the plaintiff’s copyright. Hence, the 
defendant’s efforts in misuse cases yield a benefit to multiple third 
parties who are relieved—temporarily, or for good—of the duty to 
comply with the plaintiff’s copyright.  
B. Patent Law 
Patent law predominantly recognizes individualized and general 
defenses. Class defenses are hard to find in this area of intellectual prop-
erty law, and for a good reason. Patent rights protect inventions that are 
costly to create and equally expensive to protect once they are released to 
the world.66 These rights therefore are formulated as broad categorical 
prohibitions that outlaw any use or replication of the patented invention, 
including reverse engineering and independent creation.67 This pro-
tection mechanism does not tolerate exceptions. Hence, it cannot rec-
ognize privileged groups or classes of permitted users, which explains the 
                                                                                                                                         
61. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). 
62. Id. at 363. 
63. Thomas F. Cotter, Misuse, 44 Hous. L. Rev. 901, 901 (2007).  
64. See id. at 925–31 (discussing body of case law involving misuse defense). 
65. Id. at 903. 
66. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 131 (“[T]he central 
theory behind patent law . . . posits that inventions are public goods that are costly to make 
and that are difficult to control once they are released into the world.”). 
67. Id. at 131–32; see also Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: 
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 Yale L.J. 1742, 1784–85 (2007) (arguing 
high cost of identifying and formulating socially beneficial uses of patented inventions 
justifies broad protection of patents and patent holders’ prerogative to determine 
permitted uses and users). 
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virtual absence of class defenses in patent law. At the same time, the 
patent holder’s monopoly cannot extend beyond the perimeters of her 
invention.68 Analogously to a title in land, these perimeters define the 
borders that others cannot cross. What these perimeters are and whether 
the patent holder delineated them properly are general questions that 
affect all actual and prospective users of the invention. The patent’s 
perimeters also demarcate the territory within which other creators 
should be free to pursue their endeavors. Whether one such creator 
crossed the protected borders of the patent can only be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. This dual function of patents’ perimeters explains the 
prevalence of general and individualized defenses in that area of the law.  
Many defenses to a patent infringement suit are considered “gen-
eral” under our taxonomy. These defenses go to the very issue of a 
patent’s validity. When one of them succeeds, it invalidates the patent 
and releases the underlying invention to the world. Individualized 
defenses, on the other hand, are coverage-related. To invoke such a 
defense successfully, a defendant in a patent infringement suit needs to 
demonstrate that her invention is not covered by the plaintiff’s patent.69 
The paradigmatic individualized defense to a patent infringement 
suit is a noninfringement defense. This defense consists of a showing by 
the defendant that her invention falls outside the scope of the plaintiff’s 
patent claims. For example, if the plaintiff patented a method of puri-
fying water and the defendant invented a different method for purifying 
oil, the defendant’s invention might not come within the scope of the 
plaintiff’s patent. In adjudicating a noninfringement defense, a court 
must first construe the claims of the plaintiff’s patent in order to deter-
mine its scope. Thereafter, the court must proceed to determine whether 
the defendant’s invention infringes any of the claims.70 This process 
produces valuable information about the boundaries of the plaintiff’s 
patent, but the court’s ruling in the defendant’s favor does little to shield 
third parties from future infringement suits. In fact, the exact opposite 
may happen when the court construes the patent too broadly, which, in 
turn, enlarges the group of potential infringers.  
The reverse doctrine of equivalents also falls in the category of indi-
vidualized defenses. Under this doctrine, an inventor whose invention is 
covered by the linguistically broad formulation of a prior patent claim is 
excused from patent infringement liability where the invention’s techno-
logical principle is markedly different from the one it is nominally 
                                                                                                                                         
68. Professor Jeanne Fromer aptly identified this principle as a “system of peripheral 
claiming.” See Fromer, supra note 5, at 721, 730–43.  
69. See Roger A. Ford, Patent Invalidity Versus Noninfringement, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256207 (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review) (distinguishing between invalidity and noninfringement defenses). 
70. For a superb analysis of this procedure as dependent on the patentee’s peripheral 
claiming, see Fromer, supra note 5, at 731–34. 
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infringing. As the Supreme Court famously explained in Westinghouse v. 
Boyden Power Brake Co.:  
The patentee may bring the defendant within the letter of his 
claims, but if the latter has so far changed the principle of the 
device that the claims of the patent, literally construed, have 
ceased to represent his actual invention, he is as little subject to 
be adjudged an infringer as one who has violated the letter of a 
statute to be convicted, when he has done nothing in conflict 
with its spirit and intent.71  
This case involved a conflict between two inventors of a train brake. The 
Supreme Court employed the reverse doctrine of equivalents to find that 
the defendant’s device did not infringe the plaintiff’s prior patent as the 
defendant came up with a path-breaking method of applying air pressure 
to the brake.72 Court decisions under the reverse doctrine of equivalents 
release the allegedly infringing invention from the legal grip of a prior 
patent, but do not change the legal status of other potential infringers.73 
To fend off liability, any such infringer will have to establish a set of facts 
individually vindicating her invention.74 
As already noted, patent law is extremely reluctant to recognize class 
defenses.75 One such defense—narrow, but far from insignificant—
protects scientific experimentation. This defense splits into two separate 
rules: common law and statutory. The common law defense of experi-
mental use extends to a use of another’s patent solely and strictly for 
purposes of scientific inquiry. The user’s inquiry must do science for its 
own sake and not pursue any gains or other benefits, financial or reputa-
tional.76 Academics working in different basic science areas are the 
                                                                                                                                         
71. 170 U.S. 537, 568 (1898). 
72. Id. at 572–73. See generally Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on Blocking Patents 
and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 
878 (1991) (analyzing reverse doctrine of equivalents and relevant case law). 
73. Courts, however, resort to this doctrine only on rare occasions. See Mark A. 
Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 Calif. L. Rev. 463, 468 (2012) (noting 
reverse doctrine of equivalents is rarely used by courts); see also Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. 
Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Even were this 
court likely ever to affirm a defense to literal infringement based on the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents, the presence of one anachronistic exception, long mentioned but rarely 
applied, is hardly reason to create another.”). 
74. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1581 
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Application of the doctrine requires that facts specific to the accused 
device be determined and weighed against the equitable scope of the claims, which in turn 
is determined in light of the specification, the prosecution history, and the prior art.”), 
overruled on other grounds by Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
75. Supra text accompanying notes 66–68. 
76. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding 
“experimental use” defense does not extend to those who use patent “in furtherance of 
the alleged infringer’s . . . business and . . . not solely for amusement, to satisfy idle 
curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry”). 
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primary beneficiaries of this defense. These academics form a cognizable 
class.77 
The statutory “experimental use” defense benefits one well-defined 
class: drug manufacturers.78 This defense removes liability for patent 
infringement from uses “reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs.”79 This defense allows drug 
manufacturers to use patented inventions of others in testing drugs they 
are planning to submit for the approval of the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA). This permission extends to preclinical and other 
experiments with a drug that the manufacturer ultimately decided not to 
present to the FDA.80  
As already noted, the Patent Act recognizes a multitude of general 
defenses.81 These defenses are geared toward the same goal: ensuring 
that patent protection attaches only to those inventions that satisfy 
various core requirements that make inventors deserving of exclusivity.82 
Examples of general defenses include ineligible subject matter, anti-
cipation by the prior art, lack of utility, and obviousness.83 Subject matter 
ineligibility means that the litigated patent covers an invention from a 
field of knowledge that does not qualify for patent protection.84 
Anticipation by the prior art implies that the invention specified in the 
disputed patent is not novel.85 Lack of utility (or usefulness) involves a 
claim that an invention cannot perform its stated function.86 And obvi-
ousness suggests that the invention for which the patent was issued can 
                                                                                                                                         
77. For a proposal to expand the “experimental use” defense well beyond this class, 
see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1046–59 (1989). 
78. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)(2006). 
79. Id. Originally, this provision was enacted in the Drug Price Competition and 
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 § 202, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–302 (2006). 
80. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 206–08 (2005). For a 
recent decision extending the defense to postapproval experiments, see Momenta Pharm., 
Inc. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 686 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012). For a more narrow 
interpretation of the defense, see Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC, 659 
F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
81. Supra text accompanying note 69 (explaining nature of general defenses in the 
patent context).  
82. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 128 (discussing “utility” 
requirement). 
83. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 22–26 (1966) (applying “obviousness” 
and “prior art” defenses); Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 132, 156–
57, 177–82 (outlining “ineligible subject matter” and “lack of utility” defenses). 
84. See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1041, 1064–74, 1095–111 (2011) (showing how United States Patent and 
Trademark Office can use subject matter defense to improve patent system). 
85. See, e.g., Graham, 383 U.S. at 22–24 (applying “prior art” defense). 
86. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 177–82. 
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be arrived at independently by a person skilled in the relevant tech-
nology.87  
Successful demonstration of the aforementioned defenses by a 
defendant dooms not only the plaintiff’s suit but the patent as a whole. 
As is typical of general defenses, acceptance of the defense by a court 
extinguishes the plaintiff’s right and liberates third parties to behave in 
ways that were previously considered unlawful. Concretely, the inval-
idation of an issued patent that was previously presumed valid permits 
others to manufacture the underlying product, use it, and improve upon 
it without risking liability.  
Patent law also recognizes a host of equitable defenses, such as 
misuse, inequitable conduct, and fraud on the patent office.88 Per this 
Article’s earlier discussion of the doctrine, misuse consists in anti-
competitive behavior that seeks to extend the exclusivity bestowed by the 
patent beyond its legitimate limits.89 Illegitimate restrictions on licensees 
that limit their ability to work with other technology providers and other 
forms of collaboration may amount to patent misuse.90 Proof of patent 
misuse may cost the patentee her right and it is therefore a general 
defense in our terminology. Fraud on the patent office and inequitable 
conduct involve cases of “failure to disclose material information, or 
submission of false material information, with an intent to deceive.”91 As 
is the case with misuse, inequitable conduct may render the patent unen-
forceable.92 Under each of those scenarios, the patented invention 
                                                                                                                                         
87. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 24–26 (applying “obviousness of the differences” 
defense). 
88. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 518 
(1917) (establishing patent misuse doctrine); see also Merges et al., Intellectual Property, 
supra note 30, at 384–93 (discussing Motion Picture Patents case and associated doctrine). 
89. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 389–91 (discussing 
anticompetitive patent misuses such as nonmetered licenses, grantback clauses, field-of-use 
restrictions, and patent suppression). 
90. See id. at 390 (underscoring overlaps between patent misuse doctrine and 
antitrust laws).  
91. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 872 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (en banc) (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1984)); see also In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 519 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (stating inequitable conduct involves fraud on patent office). 
92. A general equitable defense of laches is available under patent law as well. A 
defendant can successfully invoke it when a patent holder delays the filing of the 
infringement suit for an unreasonably long period and the defendant adversely changes 
her position because of the delay. See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & 
Research Found., LP, 422 F.3d 1378, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (declining to require “strict 
time limitations” for determining when defense of laches is triggered and discussing 
circumstances district court might consider when deciding whether defense would apply). 
Proof of laches prevents the patent holder from collecting past damages. At first blush, 
laches appears to be a standard individualized defense. However, it can also be classified as 
a class defense as it bestows a tangible legal benefit on all past infringers as a group. The 
implication of a laches ruling is that the plaintiff is precluded from collecting damages not 
only from the defendant he faced but also from similarly situated infringers.  
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becomes fair game for any user and replicator. The three equitable 
defenses therefore fall into our “general defense” category. 
C. Trademarks 
Trademark law protects distinctive words, names, symbols, or devices 
“used by a person . . . in commerce . . . to identify and distinguish her 
goods or services.”93 Like patent and copyright law, trademark law 
contains individualized, class, and general defenses. Trademark law 
speaks to the market: Its primary goals are to promote the production 
and improve the acquisition of goods and services.94 Specifically, trade-
mark law works to reduce source-identification costs for consumers and 
incentivize quality improvements in the trademarked goods and services, 
while protecting free competition on the market.95 The generality of this 
triple objective coincides with the prevalent defense format in the 
trademark area. The vast majority of defenses that defeat trademark 
infringement accusations are general.96  
The prevalence of general defenses, however, does not mean that 
individualized and class defenses recognized by trademark law are insig-
nificant. In fact, these defenses play an important role in delineating the 
scope of protection that our law affords to trademarks. Our exposition 
begins with individualized defenses and then moves on to discuss class 
and general defenses. 
Under this Article’s taxonomy, no likelihood of confusion is an 
individualized defense: Its protective aura is confined to the individual 
defendant who invoked it. This defense is also the most common exam-
ple of an individualized defense that fends off trademark infringement 
accusations. As previously noted, consumer confusion is the touchstone 
of trademark liability.97 The dominant justification for enacting trade-
mark protection holds that trademarks enable consumers to differentiate 
among providers of products and services.98 This, in turn, produces two 
desirable effects. First, trademark protection lowers search costs for 
                                                                                                                                         
93. See Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
94. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 763–68 (“[T]rademarks 
are widely viewed as devices that help to reduce information and transaction costs . . . .”). 
95. See id. at 766–68 (arguing advertising lowers information costs and signals high-
quality goods). 
96. See infra notes 117–132 and accompanying text (discussing general defenses in 
trademark law). 
97. See, e.g., 1 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair 
Competition § 2:1, at 2-2 to -3 (4th ed. 2011) (noting primary policy justification of 
trademark law is “interest of the public in not being deceived”). 
98. See id. § 2:3, at 2-3 (“[A] trademark is merely a symbol that allows a purchaser to 
identify goods or services that have been satisfactory in the past and reject goods or 
services that have failed to give satisfaction.”). 
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consumers.99 Second, and relatedly, it incentivizes producers to ensure 
the high quality of their trademarked goods and services as consumers 
will be able to associate the high quality with the producer.100 When 
consumers are confused about the provenance of goods and services, 
they can no longer make informed purchasing decisions and the 
producers will not be able to recoup their investment in high quality 
products and services. Hence, the role of trademark protection is to 
prevent consumer confusion.101 Contrariwise, when there is no likelihood 
of consumer confusion, typically there is no need to impose liability.102 
Accordingly, if a defendant can prove that her mark is sufficiently 
dissimilar from that of the plaintiff, or that she does not deal in the same 
goods or services as the plaintiff, a court will find no trademark 
infringement. 
Nontrademark use is another example of an individualized defense. 
In principle, use of another’s mark is actionable only when the mark is 
used in its traditional role as a source identifier.103 Use of trademarked 
terms in a scholarly essay, song lyrics, or video clip of a song performance 
is not infringement.104 Similarly, the use of a trademark in the title of a 
book—as in Lauren Weisberger’s The Devil Wears Prada—or in the title of 
                                                                                                                                         
99. See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 58 (8th ed. 2011) (“The 
economic function of trademarks . . . is to economize on consumer search costs by 
providing an assurance of uniform quality.”). 
100. Id. at 492 (“The manufacturer who has invested heavily in a trademark has a 
greater incentive to maintain quality, and knowing this a rational consumer may be willing 
to pay a premium for that manufacturer’s brand.”). 
101. What does and does not amount to consumer confusion is subject to significant 
differences of opinion. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 Calif. L. Rev. 1581, 1582–84 (2006) (highlighting fractured 
nature of consumer confusion doctrine across circuit courts of appeal). Also subject to 
controversy is whether trademark law is designed to protect consumers against bad 
decisions or, instead, improve their position as rational selectors of products and services. 
See Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2020, 
2021–25 (2005) (describing competing viewpoints of “sovereign” and “fool” personae in 
trademark advocacy and adjudication). 
102. The one important exception is dilution. Dilution is a cause of action available 
to owners of famous marks. It broadens the scope of traditional trademark protection for 
famous marks, expanding it to cases where there is no risk of consumer confusion. See 
infra text accompanying notes 133–140 (describing dilution and applying this Article’s 
taxonomy of defenses to dilution suits). 
103. For insightful analysis of the trademark use requirement, see generally Stacey L. 
Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Trademark Use Requirement in Dilution Cases, 24 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 541 (2008) (discussing history and evolution of 
trademark use requirement). 
104. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) 
(explaining use of trademarked term in song is not vulnerable to trademark infringement 
claim); see also Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 972–82 (explaining 
use of trademarked term in song is not infringing). 
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a movie—as in Breakfast at Tiffany’s—is usually not considered a trade-
mark infringement.105 
Moving now to class defenses, we begin with a paradigmatic 
example: the traditional (or classic) form of fair use. Traditional fair use 
only applies to descriptive marks, allowing third parties to use them 
“fairly and in good faith” to describe their own goods and services.106 The 
operation of that defense was famously demonstrated in the Fifth 
Circuit’s ruling in Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.107 There, 
the appellant, a food manufacturer, offered batter mixes under the 
marks “Chick-Fri” and “Fish-Fri.”108 The appellees, who operated in the 
same trade, offered similar products under the names “chicken fry” and 
“fish fry.”109 A trademark infringement suit ensued. Ruling for the 
defendant-appellee, the court reasoned that both of the plaintiff’s marks 
were descriptive.110 The court ruled that “Chick-Fri” was ineligible for 
protection altogether, as it failed to achieve “secondary meaning” among 
consumers.111 The second, “Fish-Fri,” acquired secondary meaning and 
was therefore entitled, in principle, to receive protection.112 However, the 
defendant’s use was fair, as it used the term “fish fry” in a purely 
descriptive sense to describe its own product.113 Pivotal to the court’s 
ruling was the fact that the defendant showed that “fish fry” was a generic 
name used to describe batter mix in general, and that many other food 
manufacturers used similar terms for their batter mixes.114 The 
defendant’s success in asserting the fair use defense therefore yielded a 
benefit for an entire class of actors—food manufacturers that produce 
                                                                                                                                         
105. See Mattel, 296 F.3d at 902 (“Rogers concluded that literary titles do not violate 
the Lanham Act ‘unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work . . . or . . . 
unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.’” (quoting 
Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 944, 999 (2d Cir. 1989))); see also Eastland Music Grp., LLC 
v. Lionsgate Entm’t, Inc., 707 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2013) (“The titles of Truman 
Capote’s novella Breakfast at Tiffany’s, and the movie of the same name, do not infringe the 
rights of Tiffany & Co. because no reasonable reader or moviegoer thinks that the jeweler 
is the source of the book or the movie.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-1501 (U.S. June 
17, 2013). 
106. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2012) (exempting from trademark infringement 
liability “use . . . of a term or device which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good 
faith only to describe the goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin”); see 
also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 121 (2004) 
(holding raising affirmative defense of fair use as to descriptive mark imposes no 
obligation on that party to show no likelihood of consumer confusion). 
107. 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983), abrogated by KP Permament Make-Up, 543 U.S. 111. 
108. Id. at 788. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 797. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 795–96. 
113. Id. at 796. 
114. Id. at 788, 795–96 (“At least four other companies market coatings for fried 
foods that are denominated ‘fish fry’ or ‘chicken fry.’”).  
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coating mixes—who were using the plaintiff’s mark on their own prod-
ucts.115 Although a fair use ruling has no formal precedential effect in 
suits against other parties, Zatarain’s (as well as other mark owners) 
would face an uphill battle in bringing infringement claims against other 
parties who used their marks in a descriptive sense.116  
Most defenses recognized by trademark law clearly fall under the 
category of general defenses. Consider, first, the defense of genericide.117 
Trademarks are source identifiers. As such, they must be distinctive: They 
must be able to associate a good or service with their producer. At times, 
however, the purchasing public stops associating a mark with a manu-
facturer and begins to associate it instead with a good or service. When 
this happens, the mark loses its distinctive nature and becomes ineligible 
for trademark protection. Interestingly, this phenomenon, known as 
genericide, typically afflicts the most popular marks. Marks that fell 
victim to the genericide doctrine include “Cola,”118 “Kleenex,”119 and 
“Aspirin,”120—even “Google” is on the “hit list.”121 A defendant who 
successfully raises a genericide defense strips the plaintiff of her 
trademark protection and thereby confers a benefit on multiple other 
businesses.122 The widespread use of the once-protected marks “Cola” 
and “Shredded Wheat” provide real-world examples of the beneficial 
effect genericide generates for third parties.  
                                                                                                                                         
115. Id. at 788. Although this decision yielded no formal res judicata, and the 
plaintiff was technically not precluded from suing other people, such a suit was highly 
unlikely to succeed. 
116. The trademark owner could hardly challenge the findings of a court that ended 
with this categorical concluding remark: “And so our tale of fish and fowl draws to a close. 
We need not tarry long, for our taster’s choice yields but one result, and we have other fish 
to fry.” Id. at 798. 
117. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting 
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 Trademark Rep. 1223, 1241–42 (2007) [hereinafter 
Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory] (“The genericness doctrine prevents a party 
from claiming rights to a term ‘that refers . . . to the genus of which the particular product 
is a species.’” (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d 
Cir. 1976))). 
118. See Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages, Inc., 162 F.2d 280, 283 (1st Cir. 
1947) (holding mark “Cola” had become generic and was no longer protected). 
119. See Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory, supra note 117, at 1243–44 
(explaining how “Kleenex” lost trademark protection after becoming generic). 
120. Id. at 1242 (attesting “Aspirin” became generic term and lost trademark 
protection). 
121. See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism 
Conundrum, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1789, 1789–90 (2007) (suggesting “Google” might soon 
become generic and therefore unprotected by trademark law). 
122. See Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 104 (2d Cir. 
1989) (holding “Murphy bed” is generic term no longer protected as trademark). 
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The functionality defense has the same effect on trade dress 
protection.123 Trade dress law extends protection to packages124 and 
design.125 However, trade dress protection cannot be obtained for func-
tional design elements.126 The exclusion of functional elements is 
intended to ensure that no single manufacturer obtains a perpetual 
monopoly on the design (or configuration) of a product and thereby 
gains an unfair advantage over its competitors.127 Accordingly, if a 
defendant shows that a product design for which a plaintiff claims trade 
dress protection is functional, the plaintiff will leave the courthouse 
empty-handed and the entire world will be entitled to use the relevant 
design.  
Abandonment is also a general defense because it opens the 
trademark for use by anyone. A trademark is considered abandoned 
when its owner discontinues use with intent not to resume such use.128 
Nonuse by the registered owner for a period of three consecutive years 
constitutes “prima facie evidence of abandonment.”129 Once abandoned, 
the mark’s owner may not commence infringement suits against users.130 
Furthermore, in Major League Baseball Properties, Inc. v. Sed Non Olet 
Denarius, Ltd.—a case involving a dispute over the rights in the “Brooklyn 
Dodgers” mark—the court ruled that after the mark was abandoned by 
the plaintiffs, resumption of use by the registered owner would only 
                                                                                                                                         
123. Indeed, some commentators have noted that functionality is the trade dress 
equivalent of genericide. See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory, supra note 
117, at 1247 & n.99. 
124. See, e.g., McNeil Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350, 
362–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing trade dress protection in packaging of artificial 
sweeteners). 
125. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13, 216 (2000) 
(distinguishing between “design” and “packaging” of product and holding “design” 
entitled to protection as unregistered trade dress only upon acquiring secondary 
meaning); Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 776 (1992) (holding trade 
dress protectable even without secondary meaning and according protection to decor of 
fast food restaurant). 
126. See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34–35 (2001) 
(explaining functionality doctrine and denying protection to functional trade dress). 
127. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2012) (“In a civil action for trade dress 
infringement under this chapter for trade dress not registered on the principal register, 
the person who asserts trade dress protection has the burden of proving that the matter 
sought to be protected is not functional.”); TrafFix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 29 (explaining 
burden of proof imposed by statute on party seeking trade dress protection “gives force to 
the well-established rule that trade dress protection may not be claimed for product 
features that are functional”); Qualitex Co v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164–65 
(1995) (applying functionality defense). 
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
129. Id. 
130. See, e.g., Radiance A. Walters, Partial Forfeiture: The Best Compromise in 
Trademark Licensing Protocol, 91 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 126, 137 (2009) 
(observing that, following abandonment, “third parties are free to use and exploit” 
abandoned marks). 
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cover new uses and would not grant any rights retroactively against users 
of the mark during the abandonment period.131 Moreover, such users 
might have a superior claim to the mark based on their use during the 
abandonment period as compared to the abandoning owner.132 
Our taxonomy is also applicable to defenses against suits for dilu-
tion. Dilution consists of acts that diminish the mark’s selling power or 
dim its allure.133 Protection against dilution is reserved solely for famous 
marks.134 The Lanham Act defines two types of dilution: blurring and 
tarnishment. Blurring consists of acts that “impair[] the distinctiveness 
of . . . famous mark[s].”135 Tarnishment consists of acts that “harm[] the 
reputation of [a] famous mark.”136 The Lanham Act also contains a list of 
exclusions, exempting from liability for dilution (i) “advertising or 
promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or services”;137 (ii) 
“identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the famous 
mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner”;138 (iii) 
“[a]ll forms of news reporting and news commentary”;139 and (iv) “[a]ny 
noncommercial use of a mark.”140 A claim that one’s use of a famous 
mark does not impair its distinctiveness or does not harm its reputation is 
an individualized defense. This defense vindicates only the user’s 
entitlement and nobody else’s. The exclusions for news reporting and 
parodying and for comparative advertising are class defenses. These 
defenses benefit three distinct classes: reporters and newscasters, paro-
dists, and advertisers. Finally, a showing by a defendant that the plaintiff’s 
mark is not famous is a general defense. When this defense becomes 
available, it opens the mark up to use by multiple and unspecified users. 
D. Trade Secrets 
Legal protection of trade secrets extends to technologies and 
business information that a firm develops and keeps confidential in 
order to outperform its competitors. Trade secrets law prohibits misap-
propriation of commercial information that is not generally known to 
the public.141 Information that may be claimed as a trade secret ranges 
from business strategies, market analyses, and customer lists to sophisti-
                                                                                                                                         
131. 817 F. Supp. 1103, 1131–35 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), vacated, 859 F. Supp. 80 (S.D.N.Y. 
1994) (vacating pursuant to parties’ settlement). 
132. Id. at 1132. 
133. Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1029, 1034–35 (2006). 
134. Id. at 1030–35.  
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
136. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
137. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(i). 
138. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii). 
139. § 1125(c)(3)(B). 
140. § 1125(c)(3)(C). 
141. See Merges et al., Intellectual Property, supra note 30, at 35–37 (defining 
general scope of trade secrets protection). 
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cated machinery, software, and chemical formulae (famously exemplified 
by the Coca-Cola formula, parts of Google’s search algorithm, and 
Apple’s OS X software).142 The law defines “misappropriation” as encom-
passing any acquisition or use of another’s trade secret by “improper 
means,”143 including breaches of contract, torts, and crimes, as well as 
deviations from the “accepted standards of commercial morality.”144 As 
the Supreme Court explained, this broad protection of trade secrecy 
“promotes the sharing of knowledge[] and the efficient operation of 
industry” by helping “the individual inventor to reap the rewards of his 
labor.”145  
The protection the law affords to trade secrecy is not unlimited.146 
An alleged infringer can raise a number of defenses, which, if successful, 
will exempt the defendant from liability for trade secrecy infringement. 
This Article’s taxonomy illuminates the functionality of those defenses, as 
they, too, come in the three varieties that we devised. Some of those 
defenses are individualized, while others are class and general defenses.  
Of the individualized defenses, the most important are independent 
development147 and reverse engineering.148 A defendant who successfully 
                                                                                                                                         
142. Margo E.K. Reder & Christine Neylon O’Brien, Managing the Risk of Trade 
Secret Loss Due to Job Mobility in an Innovation Economy with the Theory of Inevitable 
Disclosure, 12 J. High Tech. L. 373, 382 (2012). 
143. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(2) (amended 1985). 
144. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1014–17 (5th 
Cir. 1970) (explaining “improper means” include violations of business ethics even when 
those do not amount to an actionable tort); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1(1) (defining 
misappropriation); Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 (1995) (outlining 
rules applicable to common law actions in tort or restitution for misappropriation); see 
also Richard F. Dole, Jr., The Uniform Trade Secrets Act—Trends and Prospects, 33 
Hamline L. Rev. 409, 424–27 (2010) (articulating meaning of “improper means” in 
context of trade secrecy violations); Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade 
Secrets: A Case Study, 42 Cal. W. L. Rev. 209, 210, 221 (2006) (explaining “improper 
means” in context of trade secrecy violations and attesting they include violations of 
business ethics). 
145. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974). 
146. This protection entitles the aggrieved owner of a trade secret to injunctive and 
compensatory relief. See Unif. Trade Secrets Act §§ 2, 3; see also Dole, supra note 144, at 
432–43 (describing various approaches to injunctive relief and damages in Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act jurisdictions). The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was adopted by nearly all states 
and the District of Columbia. States that have yet to adopt it include Massachusetts, New 
York, and North Carolina. For more detailed information, see Legislative Fact Sheet—
Trade Secrets Act, Unif. Law Comm’n, http://www.uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFact
Sheet.aspx?title=Trade Secrets Act (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (last visited Sept. 
27, 2013). These states protect trade secrecy through enforcement of a roughly similar set 
of rules, summarized by section 40 of the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition. 
147. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 43 cmt. b (summarizing 
independent development defense, also identified as “independent discovery”); see also 
Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476 (“A trade secret law . . . does not offer protection against 
discovery by fair and honest means, such as by independent invention . . . .”). 
148. See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476 (attesting law allows acquisition of another’s 
trade secret “by so-called reverse engineering, that is by starting with the known product 
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raises either defense benefits only herself. For example, when the 
defendant demonstrates that she independently arrived at the plaintiff’s 
secret baby food formula through a process of trial and error or by 
dissolving the plaintiff’s product into its constituent ingredients, she will 
be entitled to an independent creation or reverse engineering defense.149 
Either defense, if successfully asserted, would benefit her and nobody 
else.150 
“General skills” and “public interest” defenses respectively represent 
the core class and general defenses. These defenses are available to 
different groups of information users. The general skills defense unlocks 
the information for the plaintiff’s employees as a class, allowing them to 
use the general training they receive from the plaintiff for other pur-
poses so they can stay competitive in the job market.151 Individuals falling 
into this class are permitted by the law to move the information, as part 
of their working skills, from one workplace to another. As an illustration 
of how the defense operates, consider a developer of cloud software who 
moves from Pear Inc. to work for another producer of cloud technology. 
Pear Inc. asks the court to enjoin the move, alleging that its inevitable 
consequence would be the revelation of the company’s trade secrets to 
the developer’s new employer. The court rules that, although the devel-
oper is not permitted to use or reveal any of Pear’s projects that remain 
secret, she is permitted to use the general knowledge of cloud technol-
ogies that she acquired while working for that company.152 Importantly, 
the general skills defense similarly privileges all the other employees of 
the firm. Hence, it is a paradigmatic class defense under our taxonomy. 
The public interest defense, by contrast, is available in a very narrow 
spectrum of cases that involve a compelling societal interest in the disclo-
                                                                                                                                         
and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or 
manufacture”); Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 cmt. (explaining reverse engineering is 
defined as a proper means of discovery under Restatement of Torts).  
149. Cf. Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 808, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 
2005) (finding development of similar combustion burners was permitted when trade 
secret was available to alleged infringer or when alleged infringer reverse engineered 
burners). 
150. If the defendant subsequently decided to share the information with the rest of 
the world, instead of keeping it to herself, she would be free to do so. Hence, in the area 
of trade secrets law, successfully raising an individualized defense might subsequently 
benefit the public at large. For economic justification of the reverse engineering defense, 
see Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse 
Engineering, 111 Yale L.J. 1575, 1582–90 (2002). 
151. See ILG Indus., Inc. v. Scott, 273 N.E.2d 393, 396 (Ill. 1971) (explaining how 
mobile and free economy prevents compelling “[o]ne who has worked in a particular 
field . . . to erase from his mind all of the general skills, knowledge and expertise acquired 
through his experience”).  
152. Cf. AMP Inc. v. Fleischhacker, 823 F.2d 1199, 1205 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(underscoring employees’ freedom to move their general skills and knowledge from one 
job to another without being constrained by trade secret laws); CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 
769 F.2d 842, 852 (1st Cir. 1985) (same). 
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sure of information otherwise deserving of protection by the trade 
secrecy law.153 An example can help explain the nature of the defense. 
Consider a scientist working for a tobacco company. The scientist 
discovers that the company uses a carcinogenic compound in its 
cigarettes, a fact that the company kept hidden from the rest of the 
world. Troubled by this finding, he decides to reveal this information to 
the public. Should the company sue the scientist for trade secrecy 
violation, the court would likely excuse him from liability based on the 
public interest defense. The “public interest” defense is appropriately 
categorized as “general” because it allows defendants, like the scientist in 
the tobacco example, to disclose secret information to the rest of the 
world with impunity and thereby annul the trade secrecy protection.154 In 
doing so, the defendant nullifies any rights the plaintiff may have had in 
that intellectual property and allows full access to it by the rest of the 
world. 
E. Summary 
The preceding discussion demonstrated how our tripartite taxon-
omy illuminates the conceptual structure and functionality of intellectual 
property defenses. The examples above feature core defenses available to 
individuals and firms sued for violating intellectual property rights. 
These examples are merely illustrative, not exhaustive. Yet our concep-
tual framework covers all intellectual property defenses. As shown in 
Table 1 below, this framework provides a comprehensive mapping of all 
defenses afforded by our intellectual property law. Each and every one of 
those defenses fits the tripartite categorization of individualized, class, 
and general defenses.  
  
                                                                                                                                         
153. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 40 cmt. c (1995) (delineating 
limited scope of permitted disclosure under “public interest” defense). 
154. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Securing Trade Secrets in the Information Age: 
Upgrading the Economic Espionage Act After United States v. Aleynikov, 30 Yale J. on Reg. 
189, 231 (2013) (“There are some trade secrets in which the public interest in disclosure is 
particularly great. These include information that a product is unsafe or unreliable, a 
threat to the environment, or invasive of personal privacy.”). 
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TABLE 1: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENSES 
 
Individualized 
Defenses Class Defenses General Defenses 
Copyright fair use 
independent 
creation 






scenes a faire 






reverse doctrine of 
equivalents 




lack of utility 
inequitable 
conduct / fraud on 
the patent office 
misuse 
exhaustion 
Trademark no likelihood of 
consumer confusion 
nontrademark use 










general skills public interest 
II. THE SPECIAL CASE OF CLASS AND GENERAL DEFENSES 
Individualized defenses pose no special challenge to policymakers. 
These defenses feature a near perfect alignment between the flows of 
costs and benefits associated with raising the defense. A defendant who 
raises an individualized defense typically bears the full cost of litigating 
the defense and stands to enjoy the full benefit of the defense if success-
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ful. In other words, in the case of individualized defenses, all costs and 
benefits are concentrated in a single person.155 Individualized defenses, 
therefore, represent a case of full internalization of costs and benefits. 
This means that a defendant will raise an individualized defense when 
the expected benefit (represented by the probability of success multi-
plied by the gain from winning) is greater than the cost. If a defendant 
estimates that the cost of defending herself against an infringement suit 
exceeds the benefit, she will simply forego raising the defense. In either 
case, there will be no adverse consequences for other users of the intel-
lectual property. For example, if Anne gets sued for copyright infringe-
ment and decides to settle the case rather than raise a “no substantial 
similarity” defense, it will not affect Beth in the least. If Beth subse-
quently gets sued by the same plaintiff, her odds of winning the case will 
not be affected by Anne’s settlement decision. 
With class and general defenses things are markedly different. Class 
and general defenses differ from individualized defenses in that they 
create positive spillovers, or externalities, that affect many other indi-
viduals and sometimes society at large.156 In the case of class and general 
defenses, therefore, there is a misalignment of costs and benefits: A 
defendant who raises a class or general defense shoulders the full cost of 
litigating it but receives only a fraction—sometimes, a small fraction—of 
the benefit. The problem is particularly acute in the case of general 
defenses. A defendant who successfully raises a general defense that leads 
to the invalidation of an intellectual property right bestows a benefit on a 
large number of users who now can use the underlying intellectual asset 
without fearing liability. For example, when Carol is sued for a patent 
infringement and she manages to show that the invention is obvious, she 
helps not only herself, but also all other users of the invention who have 
not been sued. Thanks to Carol, these users and many others become 
able to use the invention in the future. Whether Carol’s private incentive 
to invalidate the patent is commensurate with the underlying benefit to 
society is, of course, an altogether separate question and a troubling one. 
                                                                                                                                         
155. The defendant thus has all the economic characteristics of a single owner. See 
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 347, 355–56 
(1967) (developing single owner standard). 
156. See Joseph Scott Miller, Joint Defense or Research Joint Venture? Reassessing 
the Patent-Challenge-Bloc’s Antitrust Status, Stan. Tech. L. Rev., Mar. 30, 2011, at 1, 3, 
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/miller-joint-defense.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law 
Review) [hereinafter Miller, Joint Defense] (“A patent challenger who defeats a patent 
wins spoils that it must share with the world, including all its competitors. This forced 
sharing undercuts an alleged infringer’s incentive to stay in the fight to the finish—
especially if the patent owner offers an attractive settlement.”); cf. Robert P. Merges, 
Justifying Intellectual Property 300 (2011) (“Property does more than bind unknown 
individuals to one another. It also unites all individuals in a larger set of relations.”); Amy 
Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of Intellectual 
Property, 117 Yale L.J. 804, 825–39 (2008) (observing how intellectual property regimes 
pit multiple interest holders in intellectual property area against each other as groups). 
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As a self-interest maximizer, Carol may well decide not to challenge the 
patent’s validity. 
Our analysis has been confirmed in a forthcoming article by Roger 
Ford.157 Ford observed that, in patent litigation, defendants tend to raise 
a disproportionately high number of what we term “individualized” 
defenses relative to what we term “general” defenses. In particular, he 
noted that for most defendants, asserting a narrow noninfringement 
claim in combination with a comprehensive denial of the patent’s validity 
is both costly and risky. Defendants consequently prefer to raise narrow 
noninfringement claims that focus on the patent’s scope and tend not to 
challenge the patent’s validity. From their private perspective, this strat-
egy yields the highest expected return net of the litigation cost.158 
Class defenses also privilege third parties. When a court accepts a 
class defense, the benefit accrues not only to the defendant who success-
fully asserted it, but also to other members of the group to which the 
defendant belongs. For example, when an employee sued for violating a 
trade secret successfully proves that the information claimed as a trade 
secret falls into the category of general skills, she confers a benefit on her 
coworkers and on multiple other employees who received the same train-
ing and can now use their enhanced skills to secure better employment 
opportunities. 
To be sure, this Article is not the first to observe the presence of pos-
itive third-party effects in the domain of intellectual property. Professor 
Wendy Gordon pointed out that copyrighted works create informational 
benefits for nonusers.159 Elaborating on this theme, Professor Polk 
Wagner demonstrated the existence of information “cascades” in all the 
fields of intellectual property.160 Professors Gordon and Wagner, 
however, focused strictly on the beneficial effects emanating from the 
recognition of intellectual property rights as opposed to defenses. 
Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley showed, in an influential 
contribution, that the world of intellectual property is replete with 
spillovers.161 Importantly, they noted the presence of spillover effects also 
in the context of defenses.162 Professors John Thomas,163 Jay Kesan,164 
                                                                                                                                         
157. See Ford, supra note 69 (manuscript at 32–42). 
158. Id. (manuscript at 25–26). 
159. Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright 
and the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1009, 1043–46 (1990). 
160. R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the 
Mythologies of Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995, 1003–14 (2003). 
161. Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 Colum. L. Rev. 257, 258 
(2007). 
162. Id. at 286–89; see also Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case Against 
Patents, J. Econ. Persp., Winter 2013, at 3, 16 (noting defendant facing patent 
infringement allegations “receives only a slice of the overall benefits from winning the 
lawsuit, and will [therefore] be willing to spend less on such lawsuits than it would if it 
were to receive all the benefits”). 
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and Joseph Miller,165 in independent contributions, noted that actors 
who expose invalid patents bestow a benefit on third parties and called 
for the use of “bounties” to encourage opposition to suspect patents 
while they are being examined by the U.S. Trademark and Patent 
Office166 and when they are asserted in court. Finally, Edward Hsieh 
wrote an insightful Note proposing to tackle the proliferation of bad 
patents by a mandatory joinder procedure that would consolidate all 
potential patent infringers in a single action, thereby enabling them to 
share the defense expenses and mount an effective opposition to the 
patentee’s extortionary suit.167 Hsieh compared the effects of this proce-
dure with those of defendant class actions and reexamination of 
patents.168 He concluded that mandatory joinder stands out as the best 
solution to the bad patent problem.169 
This Article seeks to contribute to the literature by offering a sus-
tained analysis of the costs and benefits associated with intellectual prop-
erty defenses based on the taxonomy devised in Part I.170  
                                                                                                                                         
163. John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A 
Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 305, 342–52. 
164. Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 Berkeley 
Tech. L.J. 763, 787–97 (2002). 
165. Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 667, 668 (2004). 
166. See also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend 
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative 
Patent Review Might Help, 19 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 943, 960–64 (2004) (calling for more 
rigorous patent review by Patent Office). 
167. Edward Hsieh, Note, Mandatory Joinder: An Indirect Method for Improving 
Patent Quality, 77 S. Cal. L. Rev. 683, 688–700 (2004). 
168. See id. at 701–03; see also Brian Noh, Note, Fair Copyright Litigation: The 
Reverse Class Action Lawsuit, 9 Hastings Bus. L.J. 123, 123, 129–40 (2012) (proposing 
consolidating copyright defendants in class action); Matthew K.K. Sumida, Comment, 
Defendant Class Actions and Patent Infringement Litigation, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 843, 843, 
881–86 (2011) (same). For a seminal work on defendant class action, see generally Assaf 
Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 Calif. L. Rev. 685 (2005). 
169. Hsieh, supra note 167, at 701–02. Hsieh also proposed to supplement 
mandatory joinder with fee shifting and elimination of the validity presumption. Id. at 
703–04. We believe that the mandatory joinder rule is too harsh—both per se and because 
it pools defendants whose defenses are strictly individual with defendants asserting class 
and general defenses. Defendants whom the plaintiff is yet to sue do not always know 
whether they will be sued and what their defense would be. Hence, they may argue in 
good faith that it should be within their rights to decide about the defense only after being 
sued. Forcing them to join the defendants’ alliance would be unfair and potentially 
inefficient as well. For these reasons, we recommend a voluntary joinder mechanism that 
incorporates an opt-out provision that retains the defendants’ procedural autonomy. See 
infra Part III. 
170. See also Ford, supra note 69 (manuscript at 54) (arguing patent challengers 
prefer to rely on noninfringement defenses, instead of attacking patent’s validity, and 
proposing reform that “would permit a party that invalidates a patent to recover from 
industry competitors that otherwise would have been susceptible to a claim for infringing 
that patent”). Ford would allow successful patent challengers to sue competitors for 
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Conceptually, general defenses are the mirror image of rights in 
rem. The defining characteristic of rights in rem is that they avail against 
the rest of the world. When the law recognizes a right in rem, it subjects 
the rest of the world to that right; when a court recognizes a general 
defense, it relieves the public at large from a duty. General defenses can 
therefore be dubbed in rem defenses. Class defenses occupy a concep-
tual middle ground. They do not negate the underlying right with 
respect to which they are raised. Rather, they create an immunity zone 
for a specific activity. Class defenses therefore can be thought of as carve-
outs of in rem rights.  
Because general and class defenses generate positive externalities for 
third parties, their implementation involves a mismatch between the 
private cost-benefit analysis of the defendant and that of society at large. 
From a societal standpoint, a defense should be raised whenever the 
benefit it is expected to yield to society as a whole exceeds the cost of 
asserting it. Actual defendants, though, in deciding how much to invest 
in litigation do not consider the full societal benefit they generate. 
Instead, their decision as to whether to raise a class or general defense is 
based strictly on the fraction of the societal benefit they stand to capture. 
The part that accrues to society at large does not affect their calculus.  
An example can prove helpful in demonstrating this point. Imagine 
that Emma is sued for a copyright or patent infringement. Emma 
believes that the suit is baseless as it is predicated on an intellectual 
property right that should not have come into existence in the first place. 
In order to prove this in court, Emma would have to incur a cost of 
$100,000. The private benefit Emma would receive from winning the 
case is only $30,000. The value of a victory to society is much greater; 
assume that it is $2,000,000. From a societal standpoint, invalid intel-
lectual property rights are legal roadblocks that thwart future innovation 
and creativity. Their removal can unlock multiple productive oppor-
tunities for a large number of individuals and companies. Emma, how-
ever—and any individual defendant, for that matter—would not be 
interested in the broader societal interest. As a rational self-interest max-
imizer, she would focus solely on her private benefit ($30,000) and 
private cost ($100,000) and would choose to refrain from waging a legal 
battle.171  
More generally, a defendant in an intellectual property infringe-
ment suit—indeed, any legal suit—has three options: (a) she can surren-
der without a fight; (b) she can settle the case out of court; and (c) she 
                                                                                                                                         
accounting and recover royalties that they would otherwise have paid to the patent’s 
holder. Id. Unlike us, Ford recommends no joinder procedure, nor does he believe that 
the patent challenger should suffice herself with expense reimbursement. Id. For further 
comparison between Ford’s and our proposals, see id. (manuscript at 55–58). 
171. See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 390 (2004) 
[hereinafter Shavell, Foundations] (“The plaintiff will sue when his cost of suit is less than 
his expected benefits from suit.”). 
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can defend herself in court. If the defendant estimates that she stands no 
chance or does not have the financial wherewithal to fight the suit, she 
may decide to surrender without a fight, especially in those cases in 
which the plaintiff is seeking injunctive relief. A rational defendant 
would choose to settle or litigate only when her expected private benefit 
exceeds her private cost. When this condition obtains, defendants often 
choose to settle rather than litigate. The reasons are simple: Settling a 
dispute is typically cheaper than litigating and involves less risk. 
Importantly, holders of intellectual property rights can enhance the 
attractiveness of settling relative to litigating by offering defendants 
tempting settlements. Rightsholders, for their part, also have a clear 
preference to settle: For them, settling economizes on enforcement costs 
and eliminates the risk of an adverse outcome in court that may lead to 
the loss of the right. For that reason, as already mentioned, rightsholders 
prefer to file their suits selectively against weak defendants.172 
The upshot of our analysis is that defendants would choose to 
engage in an all-out legal battle if and only if the private gain from litiga-
tion exceeds the private cost and litigating dominates settling.173 It is 
critical to understand, though, that even then, the investment of private 
defendants in general and class defenses would fall way short of the social 
benchmark. To see this, let’s revisit our previous example involving 
Emma. Assume now that the private benefit to Emma went up to 
$150,000 while the cost of litigating remains $100,000. Now, Emma 
would choose to litigate, but the amount she would invest in litigating 
the case (up to $150,000) is much lower than the social benefit 
($2,000,000). This means that Emma would not necessarily secure the 
best possible legal representation, and if the rightsholder is willing to 
expend much greater resources on the litigation, he may end up winning 
the case in court.174 
Our discussion leads to a well-established economic insight, namely, 
the importance of developing mechanisms for internalizing external 
effects when it is cost-effective to do so.175 Externalities come in two varie-
ties: negative and positive. Negative and positive externalities are essen-
                                                                                                                                         
172. Cf. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patent Costs and Unlicensed Use of Patented 
Inventions, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 53, 68–69 (2011) (explaining patent entrepreneurs “are 
likely to be experienced in the strategic moves of demand letters, license negotiations, and 
litigation[,] [and] [o]wners of large patent portfolios may also enjoy economies of scale in 
patent assertion” (footnote omitted)). Therefore, responding to demand letters may 
become cost prohibitive, making it logical for patent users to pay for licenses “without the 
added cost of careful scrutiny.” Id. 
173. Cf. Ben Depoorter, The Upside of Losing, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 817 (2013) 
(showing people may be willing to pursue losing case to highlight their misfortune and 
trigger legal reform).  
174. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1315–17 
(showing how similarly disadvantaged litigants are forced into cheap settlements). 
175. See N. Gregory Mankiw, Principles of Economics 196–99 (6th ed. 2012) 
(defining externalities and stating social need to eliminate them when feasible). 
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tially two sides of the same coin. Negative externalities arise when actors 
do not bear the full cost of their actions and create the problem of excess 
production. The paradigmatic example of a negative externality is indus-
trial pollution.176 Absent regulation, industrialists can shift the cost associ-
ated with pollution to the rest of our society, while enjoying the full ben-
efit. Consequently, the levels of pollution they generate exceed the 
socially optimal level.  
Positive externalities are present when actors do not enjoy the full 
benefit of their behavior. In the case of activities that give rise to positive 
externalities, the social concern is with underproduction, or underin-
vestment, in the underlying activities. As we showed, this is precisely the 
problem with class and general defenses. When actual defendants are left 
to their own devices, class and especially general defenses will be under-
produced.  
Another way to look at it is through the lens of collective action 
theory.177 While all potential users of intellectual property assets would 
like to see baseless intellectual property claims challenged and invali-
dated, none of them would like to shoulder the cost of the legal 
campaign that could lead to this result. Rather, each individual user 
would prefer that the cost fall squarely on someone else. To see why, it is 
imperative to understand that the invalidation of the right would benefit 
all users irrespectively of their contribution to the legal battle. Hence, 
from the perspective of each individual actor, it is best to sit on the 
sideline and let someone else incur the cost of challenging the right. As 
articulated thus far, the rightsholder ultimately picks a person (or a firm) 
against whom to enforce his right.178 Yet, the collective action problem 
persists even after legal action is commenced against a particular defend-
ant, which means that other potential defendants would prefer to free 
ride and not join the legal fray.  
This is not to argue that class and general defenses will never be 
raised. Quite the contrary: Our analysis demonstrates that defendants will 
invoke class and general defenses when their expected private benefit 
                                                                                                                                         
176. See A.C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 172–203 (4th ed. 1932) (giving 
classic account of negative externalities and their internalization through taxes); R.H. 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 1–15 (1960) (examining allocations 
of legal entitlements and concluding that, in absence of transaction costs, each allocation 
will efficiently eliminate externalities). See generally William J. Baumol, On Taxation and 
the Control of Externalities, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972) (integrating Coasean trade in 
Pigou’s model); E.C. Pasour, Jr., Pigou, Coase, Common Law, and Environmental Policy: 
Implications of the Calculation Debate, 87 Pub. Choice 243 (1996) (analyzing Coase’s and 
Pigou’s theories). 
177. See generally Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and 
the Theory of Groups (2d ed. 1971) (offering classic account of collective action 
problems). 
178. See supra notes 156–172 and accompanying text (describing problem of positive 
externalities present in class and general defenses and incentives of rightsholders to 
choose weak defendants). 
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exceeds the private expense.179 It is equally clear that class and general 
defenses are asserted in many real-world cases. Our analysis develops two 
mutually related insights: We posit that class and general defenses are 
invoked at a lower rate than is socially optimal; and we also argue that, in 
the subset of cases in which those defenses are invoked, the resources 
invested in litigating them fall short of the socially optimal level. Both 
problems are inimical to activities that produce positive externalities.  
It likewise bears emphasis that the aforementioned problems do not 
apply with equal force to all class and general defenses in intellectual 
property law. Some class and general defenses, such as the merger 
defense in copyright law, can be raised and litigated at a relatively low 
cost. The same is true of the lack of originality defense. Indeed, the cost 
of raising general defenses to copyright infringement suits is compara-
tively low. Many of those defenses can be established by arguments that 
rely on common sense.180 In patent law, on the other hand, the cost of 
proving general defenses is very high.181 While there is no empirical data 
on the cost of litigating general defenses in trade secrecy and trademark 
cases, we estimate that the cost of establishing such defenses would be 
much higher than in copyright cases, but generally lower than in patent 
cases. 
The externalities problem has been the subject of extensive discus-
sion in the economic literature.182 Economic theory suggests that positive 
and negative externalities alike should be internalized when the benefit 
from internalization exceeds the cost.183 The most common way to 
                                                                                                                                         
179. See supra text accompanying note 174 (illustrating how self-interested 
defendants underinvest in general and class defenses). 
180. See, e.g., Gordon v. McGinley, 502 F. App’x 89, 90 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[C]opyright 
infringement analysis involves a ‘common sense’ determination, based solely on the works 
themselves, as to whether the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar to the 
copyrighted work, focusing on ‘total concept and overall feel.’” (quoting Peter F. Gaito 
Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 66 (2d Cir. 2010))); Hamil Am., Inc. 
v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 102 (2d Cir. 1999) (adjudicating copyright infringement allegation by 
“‘[g]ood eyes and common sense’” (quoting Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting 
Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974))). 
181. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the 
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55 Emory 
L.J. 61, 68–69, 69 n.35 (2006) (“‘According to a 1999 study by the Intellectual Property 
Law Association, the median total cost through the end of suit for patent litigation where 
the dollar amount at risk is $10–$100 million is $2,225,000. Just to take the case through 
discovery costs $1,491,000.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Daniel A. Crane, Exit Payments 
in Settlement of Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Antitrust Rules and Economic 
Implications, 54 Fla. L. Rev. 747, 757 (2002))). 
182. See supra note 176 (citing prominent works discussing externalities problem); 
see also Rolf Weder & Herbert G. Grubel, The New Growth Theory and Coasean 
Economics: Institutions to Capture Externalities, 129 Rev. World Econ. 488, 490 (1993) 
(underscoring knowledge as positive externality created by patent system). 
183. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 34–38 (2003) (discussing antiproperty easements which may “curb 
overexploitation by forcing the internalization of costs” and “achieve this goal by 
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internalize negative externalities is to force the externality producer to 
bear the full cost of her actions. This result is typically achieved through 
the imposition of a tax or a fine (or another penalty that may include an 
obligation to compensate the victim) on the party causing the negative 
externalities.184 The available solutions to the positive externalities 
problem are: (1) government subsidization of the underlying activity in 
order to remedy the underinvestment problem; or (2) the imposition of 
a charge on the beneficiaries commensurate with the benefit they receive 
and reimbursement of that benefit’s producer. 
The subsidy solution presents many familiar problems of its own: It 
consumes public resources,185 spurs wasteful expenditures on lobbying by 
interest groups,186 and foments rent-seeking among politicians.187 Our 
reform proposal in Part III therefore steers away from subsidies and 
focuses on charging the beneficiaries. We develop two innovative mech-
anisms that ameliorate the positive externalities problem in intellectual 
property litigation by allocating the cost of class and general defenses to 
the larger pool of individuals and firms that benefit from those defenses. 
III. PROCEDURE AND SUBSTANCE IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENSES  
Under the current legal regime, a single defendant must bear the 
cost of raising and litigating general and class defenses, while the benefits 
of this endeavor are spread over a much larger group of individuals. As 
shown in Part II, this state of affairs is neither fair nor efficient. It results 
in underproduction of class and general defenses and in the singling out 
of relatively weak defendants by intellectual property holders. The 
current state of affairs can be summarized by the caption “one for all.” 
These words, however, are typically complemented by “all for one” in 
order to convey the virtues of unity, solidarity, and collective action. 
                                                                                                                                         
deliberately creating a holdout problem—a strategic problem that many commonly see as 
the bane of the property system”); Demsetz, supra note 155, at 354–57 (“[P]roperty rights 
arise when it becomes economic for those affected by externalities to internalize benefits 
and costs.”). See generally Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 1641 
(2011) (investigating externalities entrepreneurs). 
184. See Pigou, supra note 176, at 172–203 (attesting taxes and subsidies can 
ameliorate problem of both positive and negative externalities).  
185. See Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A 
Comparative Perspective, 2 J. Legal Analysis 473, 475–76 (2010) (surveying economic 
literature showing subsidies can be socially costly). 
186. See Lynn A. Stout, Uncertainty, Dangerous Optimism, and Speculation: An 
Inquiry into Some Limits of Democratic Governance, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1177, 1196 (2012) 
(“[A]n extensive literature investigates how small, organized interest groups . . . can push 
through self-interested policy agendas . . . that exploit a much larger but more 
disorganized and inattentive general public.”). 
187. See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 16, at 247 (explaining, where 
prospect of government subsidies is “liable to spark fierce competition for rents among 
business owners” seeking benefits, “[p]oliticians . . . may also invest time and money to 
secure concessions and payments from the businesses vying for the government money”).  
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Guided by these virtues, as well as by efficiency considerations, we 
present in this Part two procedural solutions that would allow intellectual 
property defendants who raise class and general defenses to enlist the 
help of other defendants in waging their legal battles. These proposals 
introduce a voluntary joinder mechanism: The actual defendant would 
be allowed to implead as codefendants other alleged users of the intellec-
tual property. Impleaded parties would be at liberty to refuse to join. 
However, the refusal would have one of the two following consequences: 
(1) defendants declining to join would be precluded from raising the 
same defense(s) should they be sued in the future, and hence the 
original defendant’s loss would be their loss, too; or, in the alternative, 
(2) in the event of a favorable court decision, the unallied defendants 
would have to reimburse the litigating defendant for her expenditures 
on vindicating the defense.  
As we will show, these proposals create a better alignment of private 
and societal interests with respect to intellectual property rights and go a 
long way toward leveling the playfield between plaintiffs and defendants 
in the intellectual property realm. Importantly, our proposed mecha-
nisms are noncoercive; both of our mechanisms permit potential 
defendants to decide whether or not to join the relevant suit. However, 
these mechanisms change the payoff associated with not joining. 
Permitting voluntary joinder of potential defendants would produce 
two important benefits.188 First, it would eliminate free riding and the 
resulting unfairness to the individual bearer of defense costs. Second, 
and as importantly, it would dramatically improve the defendants’ 
chances of defeating strike suits filed by the intellectual property owner. 
The resulting empowerment of weak defendants, in turn, would erode 
the rightsholders’ incentive to file those suits. 
                                                                                                                                         
188. Cf. Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 Geo. L.J. 759, 814–18 
(2012) (contemplating adjustable joinder regime allowing courts to approve addition of 
any litigant for reasons of fairness and expediency); Miller, Joint Defense, supra note 156, 
at 16–23 (arguing plural accused patent infringers should be permitted to form joint 
defense agreements and positing such agreements align with antitrust law despite old 
decision suggesting otherwise in Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. 
Pa. 1965), aff’d in relevant part, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966)). Antitrust law actually 
permits joint defense agreements so long as they do not impose anticompetitive restraints 
on primary activities. In Gould v. Control Laser Corp., the court said: 
The Third Circuit unanimously sustained the district court’s reasoning [in 
Jones Knitting] on the antitrust issue, emphasizing as had the court below that 
the competing members of the defense group had done more than merely 
enter into an agreement to challenge the validity of the Morgan patents. A 
major purpose of the group was to obtain industry-wide agreement to refuse to 
negotiate with Morgan for licensing and consequently “‘[t]he freedom of each 
plaintiff to deal freely with Morgan was restrained by the requirement of giving 
notice’” to all the members of the group.  
462 F. Supp. 685, 690 (M.D. Fla. 1978) (second alteration in Jones Knitting) (quoting Jones 
Knitting, 361 F.2d at 459). 
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The implementation of our proposal would remediate another 
asymmetry: that between the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s powers to 
formulate the dispute. Our civil procedure rules privilege the plaintiff by 
making him “master of his complaint” who decides unilaterally which 
defendants he will and will not sue.189 Currently, defendants have no 
power to add additional defendants whom the plaintiff chose not to 
sue.190 The plaintiff alone is in charge of framing the lawsuit. And here, 
as in other cases in which an individual is granted exclusive power, power 
corrupts. Plaintiffs’ exclusive power to determine the identity of the 
defendant(s) in any given case creates a real possibility of strategic abuse 
of defendants. As we have shown in Part II, intellectual property owners 
may often use this power to target weak defendants who cannot ade-
quately defend themselves against spurious claims of patent, trademark, 
and copyright infringement or trade secrecy violation. Strategic targeting 
of defendants often forces them to surrender and settle cases out of 
court.191  
Worse yet, plaintiffs have sole control over the decision whether to 
settle or not. In appropriate cases, plaintiffs can take advantage of the 
broad control they have over the litigation process to forego the settle-
ment option and obtain, instead, a court ruling that upholds their intel-
lectual property claims.192 This option is especially appealing when a 
plaintiff faces no real opposition from a financially constrained defend-
ant. Obtaining a court ruling is costlier than settling in the short run, but 
it has the potential to dramatically reduce subsequent enforcement 
efforts. The victorious plaintiff may leverage the court’s ruling by enforc-
ing his rights against other defendants. By securing favorable court opin-
ions, intellectual property owners can shape the legal climate in their 
                                                                                                                                         
189. See Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 395, 398–99 (1987) (attesting 
plaintiff is master of his complaint); Garbie v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 211 F.3d 407, 410 
(7th Cir. 2000) (“[P]laintiffs as masters of the complaint may include (or omit) . . . parties 
in order to determine the forum.” (citing Caterpillar Inc., 482 U.S. at 392)); Hughbanks v. 
Dooley, 788 F. Supp. 2d 988, 1000 (D.S.D. 2011) (“Because ‘a plaintiff is the master of his 
complaint,’ the number of defendants and claims is within [his] control.” (quoting BP 
Chems. Ltd. v. Jiangsu Sopo Corp., 285 F.3d 677, 685 (8th Cir. 2002))); 16 James Wm. 
Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 107.14[2][c], at 107-100 (3d ed. 2013) (“In general, 
the plaintiff is the master of the complaint . . . and has the option of naming only those 
parties the plaintiff chooses to sue, subject only to the rules of joinder . . . .”). 
190. The only exception to this principle is the impleader procedure that allows a 
defendant to add a claim against any third party obligated to reimburse him, wholly or 
partially, for the amount he would owe the plaintiff if the court found him liable. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 14. 
191. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (arguing rightsholders strategically 
file suits against weak defendants to force settlements). 
192. See generally Posner, supra note 99, at 765 (explaining how precedential value 
of winning motivates plaintiffs to go to trial instead of settling).  
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favor and subsequently use their victories to wage legal battle against 
stronger defendants.193 
Permitting the joinder of potential defendants may generate 
important political benefits as well. An actual defendant would naturally 
seek the “company” of powerful partners when their involvement could 
be secured.194 The defendant would therefore implead parties with 
considerable financial and political clout.195 The emerging alliances, in 
turn, may prompt important legislative changes in the domain of intel-
lectual property law. The involvement of large corporations as defend-
ants in real-world cases may lead in the long run to the scaling back of 
the scope and nature of intellectual property rights, as well as the enact-
ment of legislation that would protect innocent users from strategic 
abuse by intellectual property holders. For example, Congress could 
condition the commencement of infringement suits on commercial-
ization and actual use of the intellectual property rights by their 
holders.196 In the alternative, Congress could broaden the definition of 
the misuse doctrine as applied to intellectual property rights or empower 
courts to order abusive rightsholders to pay punitive damages.197  
As Part II has demonstrated, the invalidation or narrowing down of 
an intellectual property right owing to the vindication of a valid general 
or class defense is a desirable outcome not just for the defendant, but 
also for society at large. When such a defense is successfully asserted, it 
unlocks welfare-enhancing opportunities not only for the defendant, but 
also for many other users of the intellectual property who presently do 
not shoulder the burden of litigating the defense. The willingness of an 
individual defendant to assert a general or class defense depends on a 
comparison of the private expected benefits she stands to reap (if 
successful) and the private cost she stands to bear.198 The defendant’s 
                                                                                                                                         
193. Cf. Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability, 157 U. Pa. L. Rev. 959, 972–73 (2009) (observing prosecutors as repeat 
players use “other cases as informal precedents in negotiations” to achieve favorable plea 
bargains). 
194. Cf. supra text accompanying note 23 (providing example). 
195. Presently, the political arena is dominated by firms that own intellectual 
property and seek to enjoin users. See, e.g., Jonathan Zittrain, What the Publisher Can 
Teach the Patient: Intellectual Property and Privacy in an Era of Trusted Privication, 52 
Stan. L. Rev. 1201, 1218 (2000) (attesting entertainment industry has lobbying clout to 
influence Congress and describing political influence of potential fair users as weak). 
196. For an academic proposal that points in this direction, see Ted Sichelman, 
Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341, 400–11 (2010) (suggesting creation of new 
commercialization patent granted in exchange for commitment to make and sell novel 
product). 
197. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1368–71 
(arguing courts should have discretion to impose equitable measures and award punitive 
damages to combat strategic litigants). 
198. See Shavell, Foundations, supra note 171, at 390 (explaining litigants’ cost-
benefit calculation). 
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private calculus does not take into account the broader social benefit 
from removing invalid intellectual property rights. Hence, per discussion 
in Part II, defendants would often refrain from litigating general and 
class defenses in order to secure an outcome that is privately more advan-
tageous. 
To better align the interests of private defendants and society as a 
whole, this Article proposes giving actual defendants the power to form 
an alliance with other potential defendants. We define potential defend-
ants as those who have arguably infringed the same intellectual property 
right invoked in the suit against the actual defendant. These potential 
defendants have not yet been sued, but there is a realistic chance that 
they will be sued in the future by the same plaintiff. Their legal fate will 
thus be affected by the success or failure of the defendant who was actu-
ally sued.  
To allow participation by these defendants, this Part proposes that a 
defendant who raises a class or general defense be permitted to implead 
them. Prior to exercising this power, the defendant would have to find 
out who these potential defendants are. For a defendant asserting a class 
defense, this search would be confined to her own industry or class of 
users. The defendant would therefore find it relatively easy to identify 
potential future defendants. For a defendant who relies on a general 
defense, the search would be more complicated. Such a defendant would 
do well to concentrate her search on large companies that are using the 
underlying patent, trademark, trade secret, or copyright. Impleading 
those companies would be in the defendant’s best interest, as they would 
be able to commit substantial resources to the joint enterprise. In the 
case of copyrights and trademarks, use by others should be common 
knowledge as such use is done openly and publicly. Infringement suits 
involving patents and especially trade secrets would pose a greater chal-
lenge since the activities that constitute infringement often occur away 
from the public eye and are shrouded by secrecy. Yet, even in these cases, 
industry participants are likely to know what technologies and know-how 
their rivals are using or are likely to use in the future. Such general 
information should enable the defendant to compile a list of potential 
defendants to implead. Importantly, the search here would likely be bi-
directional: Some users of the underlying intellectual property would 
reach out to the defendant and propose themselves as allies. 
The impleaded parties would be given the option to join the 
defendant’s alliance, and if they decided to do so, they would become 
formal defendants in the suit. The defendant’s alliance would then 
appoint an attorney and establish a fund that would pay for the defend-
ants’ common expenditures on the litigation. The defendants would 
bear the cost of litigating the case in equal parts, unless they agreed 
among themselves to allocate the cost differently. 
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A. Preclusion 
The impleaded parties would be free to decline the invitation to join 
the alliance. Refusal, however, would entail a cost. Parties who declined 
the invitation to join the alliance would be able to benefit from the alli-
ance’s success in the litigation and the consequent removal of the intel-
lectual property right. However, declining parties would bear a conse-
quence in the case of failure: We propose to set up a preclusion rule that 
would bar them from raising any class or general defense in any future 
litigation that was invoked by the actual defendant(s) unsuccessfully. 
Parties who were invited to join but chose to decline would thus not be 
permitted to relitigate a defense that was raised in the case they chose 
not to join. If the intellectual property owner decided to sue them, they 
would only be able to raise individualized defenses.  
The prospect of not being able to invoke a general or class defense 
in the event of a suit is likely to prompt prospective defendants to join 
the alliance. Many such defendants would likely be willing to participate 
in the collective effort at vindicating a class or general defense.199 
This solution is potentially attractive, but it also has a number of 
shortcomings. As an initial matter, it is inconsistent with the overall 
design of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. These rules do not allow a 
defendant to implead additional defendants and force them to share the 
costs of vindicating the defense.200 Nor do they extend the preclusion bar 
to nonparties.201 Hence, introduction of our solution would require an 
overhaul of our civil procedure system as it currently stands. Second and 
more important, applying res judicata to parties who decided not to join 
penalizes not only the parties themselves, but also society at large. When 
an intellectual property right is invalid, it is in society’s interest to have it 
invalidated. Parties who choose not to join may often be well positioned 
to achieve this result. Barring them from challenging invalid intellectual 
property rights would therefore be detrimental to the societal interest. 
Our second solution, however, avoids both problems. This solution 
incorporates an opt-out rule that retains the potential defendants’ 
procedural autonomy. 
                                                                                                                                         
199. Cf. Hsieh, supra note 167, at 701–04 (favoring mandatory joinder of 
defendants). 
200. See supra note 190 and accompanying text (describing rules making plaintiff 
“master of his complaint” and exception under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 
allowing defendants to add claims against third parties who are obligated to reimburse if 
found liable). 
201. See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2381 (2011) (declining to accept 
claim that “flies in the face of the rule against nonparty preclusion [that] perforce leads to 
relitigation of many issues”); Ashley v. City of Jackson, Miss., 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“It is a fundamental premise of 
preclusion law that nonparties to a prior action are not bound by the judgment.” (citing 
Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 593 (1974); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110 (1969))). 
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B. Restitution  
Under our restitution mechanism, parties who receive the defend-
ant’s invitation to join the case would be able to decline the invitation 
penalty-free. These parties would not be precluded from raising a class or 
general defense in their future litigation against the plaintiff. They would 
have their day in court with any defense they might decide to raise even 
if the plaintiff defeated the defendant. However, if the defendant 
succeeded at vindicating a class or general defense, the unallied parties 
would have to pay her their fair share of the litigation cost. This mecha-
nism therefore can be characterized as an opt-out rule coupled with a 
charge for success. In cases of failure, the impleaded parties who opted 
out would not be obligated to reimburse the defendant. 
The “fair share” charge should reflect the unallied party’s share in 
the allied defendants’ cost of litigating the defense, as well as a premium 
for the risk of losing the case taken by those defendants.202 A party who 
turned down an invitation to join the alliance would be exempt from the 
compensation duty only if she completely forewent the activity that the 
alliance unlocked for her. A simple numerical example helps illustrate 
how our mechanism would work. Assume that Innovative Software 
Solutions Inc. (ISS) is impleaded to join a patent infringement case to-
gether with eight other defendants. ISS does not trust any of these 
defendants, and it also fears that the stock market would react negatively 
to its involvement in the case. For these reasons, it decides to decline the 
invitation. The other defendants successfully invalidate the plaintiff’s 
patent after a long legal battle at a combined cost of $1,000,000. In this 
scenario, ISS would have to pay one-ninth of the aggregate cost of 
defense plus a premium of 50%.203 The 50% premium represents the 
statistical base rate in litigation: When one has no specific information 
about the merits of the parties’ claims, the plaintiff and the defendant 
are deemed to have an equal (50%) chance of winning the case.204 This 
premium amount also tracks the approximate rate at which patents are 
invalidated in litigation.205 Of course, if an impleaded party estimates that 
                                                                                                                                         
202. See Goldberger v. Integrated Res., Inc., 209 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2000) (laying down 
core precedent on “lodestar formula” as accounting for risk taken by class representative 
in calculating her compensation); see also McDaniel v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 595 F.3d 411, 
424 (2d Cir. 2010) (“The level of risk associated with litigation . . . is ‘perhaps the foremost 
factor’ to be considered in assessing the propriety of a multiplier. . . .” (quoting Goldberger, 
209 F.3d at 54)). 
203. The company’s total payment would thus be approximately $166,667.00: 
($1,000,000 / 9 = $111,111 + $111,111 × 50%). 
204. The 50% assumption here rests on the “principle of indifference” that underlies 
much of probabilistic calculus. See Alex Stein, The Flawed Probabilistic Foundation of 
Law and Economics, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 199, 218–21 (2011) (explaining and illustrating 
principle of indifference). 
205. See supra note 17 (citing studies demonstrating approximate 50% invalidation 
rate in patent litigation). 
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the defense has a better than 50% chance of succeeding, it can simply 
join the alliance and avoid paying the premium. If, by contrast, an 
impleaded party estimates that a general defense stands a very low 
chance of success—say, only 20%—it will opt out. Recall that under our 
proposal if a defense fails, impleaded parties who choose to opt out will 
pay nothing.  
Importantly, our proposal harnesses the private information of 
impleaded parties and is therefore capable of generating a socially desir-
able separating equilibrium. When a general defense has a high proba-
bility of success, impleaded parties have an incentive to join in order to 
avoid the 50% premium. When a defense has a low probability of success, 
impleaded parties will prefer to opt out. From a societal perspective, it is 
better when defendants with meritorious defenses succeed and those 
who raise phony defenses fail. Critically, our goal is not to invalidate 
intellectual property rights in general, but only those that should not 
have existed in the first place.  
This reimbursement system tracks the principles of unjust enrich-
ment and restitution. These principles entitle an individual who made a 
payment on another person’s behalf or invested in another person’s 
property to recover from that person equitable reimbursement. This re-
imbursement entitlement aims at preventing windfalls and at removing 
obstacles to efficient bargaining.206 
In an article that has been written contemporaneously with this one, 
Roger Ford proposes a solution in the context of patent litigation that 
bears a resemblance to our restitution mechanism. He suggests that a 
patent defendant who successfully raises a defense that falls into the 
category of general defenses be given the power to bring an accounting 
suit against other parties who used the invalidated patent. These parties 
would then be obligated to pay the defendant royalties otherwise payable 
to the patent’s holder. By this measure, Ford seeks to empower successful 
patent defendants to collect the upside of their success from other 
parties.207 While we are naturally sympathetic to Ford’s proposal, we 
believe that reimbursement for cost, rather than accounting for profits, is 
the right benchmark. First, as we explained, defendants often face 
liquidity constraints and thus do not have the financial wherewithal to 
mount an effective defense.208 Hence, it is important to empower them to 
enlist early on the help of other parties. The prospect of collecting 
profits at the end of the process might not suffice to prompt defendants 
to engage in costly and prolonged legal battles. Second, the profits of 
                                                                                                                                         
206. See Posner, supra note 99, at 168–69 (analyzing transaction costs within the 
context of unjust enrichment and restitution). 
207. Ford proposes two additional measures: alleviating defendants’ burden of 
proving invalidity and allowing them to bifurcate the trial and have the invalidity claim 
adjudicated first. See Ford, supra note 69 (manuscript at 49–53). 
208. See supra notes 172–173 and accompanying text (discussing defendants’ cost-
and-benefit considerations in intellectual property infringement cases). 
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other parties are notoriously difficult to prove.209 The determination of 
the profit amounts might lead to expensive satellite litigation that would 
significantly erode the amounts ultimately collected by successful 
plaintiffs. Third, a very large percentage of all patented inventions are 
never commercialized.210 This means that in many cases there will simply 
not be any profits to collect.  
C. The Effect of the Proposed Reform on Out-of-Court Settlements 
It must be borne in mind that most cases involving claims of intellec-
tual property violations never reach the court. A burgeoning literature 
points to a growing number of intellectual property rightsholders who 
take advantage of asymmetrical litigation costs to extract out-of-court 
settlements from users.211 Claims asserted by the rightsholders are often 
frivolous.212 However, due to the cost of the legal process, many defend-
ants find it more economical to settle than to litigate. The rightsholders, 
as repeat players, enjoy economies of scope and scale that most defend-
ants lack. Large patent, copyright, and trademark owners—and, to a 
lesser degree, trade secret holders—can take advantage of the disparity 
in litigation costs to extract payments from infringing and noninfringing 
users, without taking the case to court. Worse yet, large rightsholders can 
employ this strategy even when their claims lack merit.213  
As an illustration, consider a small neighborhood restaurant that 
receives a letter from McDonald’s Corporation alleging the tarnishing of 
one of McDonald’s trademarks and demanding payment of $6,000. The 
small business proprietors believe that the claim is spurious, as the mark 
invoked by McDonald’s does not qualify as famous and thus does not 
                                                                                                                                         
209. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the 
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 Yale L.J. 1339, 1350 & n.31 (1985) 
(attesting accounting for profits for purposes of disgorgement is uncertain, complicated, 
lengthy, and expensive procedure); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement 
Co., 377 U.S. 476, 505 (1964) (acknowledging Patent Act‘s substitution of injunctive relief 
for profit accounting and commending its simplicity). 
210. See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 
1495, 1507 (2001) (“[T]he total number of patents litigated or licensed for a royalty (as 
opposed to a cross-license) is on the order of five percent of issued patents.”). 
211. See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons for Patent Policy from Empirical 
Research on Patent Litigation, 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 1, 14 (2005) (“[P]art of the private 
value created by patents arises from strategic patent litigation. . . . First, firms use patents 
to ward off patent suits by . . . competitors. Second, dominant firms threaten or file 
predatory patent suits against smaller . . . competitors. Third, firms threaten or file 
opportunistic patent suits to earn nuisance settlement payments.”); Parchomovsky & Stein, 
Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1345–52 (describing asymmetric litigation costs 
in copyright, patent, and trademark cases). 
212. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1345–52 
(illustrating and discussing strategic litigation abuse in intellectual property context). 
213. Id. at 1345 (demonstrating via hypothetical how defendants are forced to settle 
illegitimate claims). 
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qualify for protection against dilution.214 However, on the very realistic 
assumption that it would cost the small business at least $15,000 to hire 
legal representation and litigate the case, the business may well settle the 
claim to avoid litigation. The same economic logic drives the decision-
making process of users of expressive works and inventions who are faced 
with the “litigate or settle” dilemma. As Professor James Gibson demon-
strated, the decision of individual users to surrender without a fight 
results in an ever-growing expansion in the scope of rights of intellectual 
property owners and in the erosion of users’ privileges.215  
The expansion of rights via out-of-court settlements is undesirable 
from a societal perspective. Yet, few defendants can afford to incur the 
much higher cost of litigating and standing for principle, while plaintiffs 
who sue them are repeat players litigating at a discounted fee.216 
Moreover, as already explained, these defendants can be readily identi-
fied and passed over by rightsholders. Under the current legal regime, 
not much can stop rightsholders from employing a legal “divide and 
conquer” strategy.  
Enter our proposals. Implementation of either one of them would 
dramatically change the balance of power between rightsholders and 
users. The ability to implead other defendants under the preclusion 
mechanism, or to collect their contributions in the case of success under 
the restitution mechanism, would remediate the baseline disparity in the 
litigation costs between plaintiffs and defendants. Realizing this, 
rightsholders would be much less inclined to engage in the scare tactics 
against individual users and cash-strapped corporations that they employ 
today.  
Implementation of either one of our proposals would lead to a 
much transformed legal reality in which meritorious claims would be 
asserted and prosecuted, whereas frivolous ones would not be pursued. 
We estimate, therefore, that adoption of our proposals would result in a 
substantial decline in the number of patent, copyright, and trademark 
trolls and in a serious downsizing of the cottage industry of cease and 
desist letters.217  
                                                                                                                                         
214. See supra notes 133–140 and accompanying text (explaining trademark 
protection against threat of dilution). 
215. James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 
116 Yale L.J. 882, 884–86 (2007). 
216. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1345–52. 
217. For discussions of litigation abuse in intellectual property, see Benjamin J. 
Bradford & Sandra J. Durkin, A Proposal for Mandatory Patent Reexaminations, 52 IDEA 
135, 136–37, 142–45 (2012) (documenting massive litigation abuse by patent trolls); 
Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, the ITC, and the Public Interest, 98 
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 2 (2012) (describing patent trolls’ business model as “using the threat of 
an injunction to reach a favorable settlement with the defendant”); Leah Chan Grinvald, 
Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. Rev. 625, 628 (“Large corporations send out 
multitudes of letters demanding small businesses . . . [to] cease and desist in their use of a 
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Equally important, these mechanisms would practically eliminate an 
individual defendant’s opportunity to strike a collusive settlement 
agreement with the owner of the challenged intellectual property right. 
The defendants’ coalition would prevent individual dealings while main-
taining collective bargaining with the plaintiff. The defendants would 
always decide collectively whether to accept or reject the plaintiff’s 
settlement offer. An individual defendant consequently would feel less 
pressure to settle and would be unable to benefit herself at the expense 
of other defendants by striking a one-sided settlement with the plaintiff. 
Her opportunity for striking a separate settlement would exist for a very 
short period of time: after receiving the plaintiff’s complaint and before 
asking other defendants to join in. During that period, the defendant 
would not have much to offer the plaintiff; she would only be able to give 
up her own defense, allowing the plaintiff to prevail against her. This, 
however, would give very little to the plaintiff who has yet to fight a legal 
battle against a strong coalition of other defense holders. 
IV. OBJECTIONS 
Our proposed mechanisms are not cost free. Empowerment of 
defendants would change their bargaining power vis-à-vis plaintiffs. For a 
number of reasons, this shift in the balance of powers may not always 
work to society’s benefit. First and most important, the defendants’ 
alliances may prove too formidable. By reducing their collective expendi-
ture on the trial, the allied defendants may become able to overpower 
deserving owners of intellectual property in the settlement arena and in 
court.218 Second, one might argue that the spillover problem we are 
trying to resolve is not really a problem but rather a normal—and hence 
tolerable—consequence of paving the path of the law.219 Arguably, the 
spillover dynamic here is analogous to a precedent-creation framework 
within which one litigant benefits many without asking anything in 
return. Last, there may be conflicts of interest between the allied defend-
                                                                                                                                         
trademark . . . . These letters seem intended to simply intimidate the small business or 
individual into forgoing the use and/or registration of their trademark.” (footnotes 
omitted)); Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1345–52 
(explaining ways firms with large economies of scale gain litigation advantage against 
smaller defendants who bear greater litigation costs). Remarkably, the Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 332–33 (2011) (to be codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C.), curbs litigation abuse by patent holders by restricting their ability 
to sue multiple defendants in a single action. For thorough analysis of this legislation, see 
generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 652 (2013). We approach 
the problem from the other end: Our proposals seek to empower meritorious defendants 
instead of disempowering strategic plaintiffs. 
218. See Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1341 
(noting parties with comparatively lower litigation costs can dominate litigation and 
overpower opponents regardless of merits by extracting favorable settlements). 
219. Cf. Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 457–64 
(1897) (coining “path of the law” metaphor). 
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ants. Multiple defendants might form conflicting views about the most 
desirable trial strategy and agreeable settlements. As a result, fewer cases 
would settle and there would be a greater number of costly trials. 
We now move to consider these objections in the order presented. 
A. Imbalance of Powers  
Admittedly, the defense holders’ opposition might turn out to be 
too strong: It might be able to defeat a deserving plaintiff or force her 
into a settlement that obliterates her intellectual property right. This 
prospect does not reflect the existing balance of power between owners 
and users of intellectual property.220 This prospect, however, is not un-
realistic either and, therefore, should be considered.  
Regular civil procedure mechanisms can likely fend off spurious 
defenses, whose only purpose is to put pressure on the intellectual prop-
erty owner and force her into an extortionary settlement. The most 
potent of those mechanisms are fee shifting and other sanctions under 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule authorizes the 
court to obligate a defendant whose defense was found to be frivolous or 
extortionary to pay the plaintiff her attorney’s fee.221 Another mechanism 
is the burden of proof doctrine that normally requires a defendant to 
prove his defense against the suit by a preponderance of the evidence222 
and, sometimes, by clear and convincing evidence.223 This requirement 
extends to most defenses that can be raised against suits that allege a 
copyright, patent, or trademark violation.224 While trying to satisfy this 
requirement, the defendants’ coalition would face the owner of the intel-
lectual property who stands to capture the full amount of her success in 
court. Unlike defendants who raise general or class defenses, this owner 
would be fully determined to protect her entitlement and properly invest 
                                                                                                                                         
220. Parchomovsky & Stein, Relational Contingency, supra note 19, at 1345–52 
(showing how owners of patents, trademarks, and copyrights utilize economies of scale 
and scope to force users to surrender without legal battle). 
221. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. 
222. E.g., Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 3.3, at 111 (5th 
ed. 2012) (attesting affirmative defenses generally must be proven by defendant by 
preponderance of evidence).  
223. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding 
patent’s invalidity must be proven by clear and convincing evidence). 
224. See, e.g., Lee Ann W. Lockridge, When Is a Use in Commerce a Noncommercial 
Use?, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 337, 377 n.207 (2010) (“[B]ased on the overall statutory 
structure and the logical allocation of the burden of proof, noncommercial use is an 
affirmative defense and should be treated as such.”); Irina Oberman, Maintaining the 
Clear and Convincing Evidence Standard for Patent Invalidity Challenges in Microsoft Corp. 
v. i4i Limited Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011), 35 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 439, 446 (2012) 
(attesting courts impose heightened burden of proof upon challengers of patents’ 
validity); Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1177, 1209 (2000) (“[F]air use would be an equitable and affirmative defense with 
the burden of proof on the infringer.”). 
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in the court proceedings. Oftentimes, the economic value of the owner’s 
intellectual asset would also be high enough to attract investors who 
would contribute to the owner’s litigation effort. Therefore, courts can 
protect deserving owners of intellectual property against unmeritorious 
challenges by defendants’ coalitions.225 
B. The Precedent Formation Analogy 
Another objection to our proposal analogizes the collective action 
problem that the proposal resolves to the precedent formation process. 
This process often involves a single actor who incurs substantial litigation 
expenses to obtain a favorable ruling on a legal issue from a state’s 
highest court or from the United States Supreme Court. The actor’s 
success in that endeavor benefits many individuals and firms not partici-
pating in paying her expenses. Arguably, these spillovers are byproducts 
of the litigation process that creates legal precedent.226 If this observation 
is correct, what separates an actor who works to create a general legal 
precedent from an actor who unlocks a general or class defense against a 
patent, copyright, or trademark infringement claim? 
At first glance, the endeavors of the two actors appear identical. 
Both actors produce social benefits that will be enjoyed by nonpaying 
strangers. As a self-interest maximizer, each actor will consequently be 
willing to sacrifice the uncaptured social benefit for her private gain. 
This motivation, however, is not self-fulfilling; to realize it, the actor must 
have an opportunity to advance her interest by foregoing the production 
of the benefit she cannot capture. As articulated in Part II, this oppor-
tunity looms large in litigation over general (and class) intellectual prop-
erty defenses. In intellectual property litigation, defendants often have a 
financial incentive to forfeit their defenses and agree to a settlement or a 
court verdict that reaffirms the plaintiff’s intellectual property entitle-
ment. 
The precedent formation process does not give private actors the 
same opportunity for self-enrichment. The reason is simple: Private liti-
gants cannot shape legal precedent by striking a collusive agreement 
between themselves.227 The legal system views precedent as a social good 
                                                                                                                                         
225. We acknowledge the possibility of an extreme scenario in which large 
corporations join forces to attack valid intellectual property rights. Large corporations, 
however, can accomplish their litigation goals without relying on our preclusion and 
restitution mechanisms. Furthermore, a large corporation would often be better off 
striking a mutually beneficial deal with the intellectual property owner instead of 
challenging her entitlement in court. 
226. See Posner, supra note 99, at 745 (explaining social value of precedents). 
227. See U.S. Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall P’ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1994) 
(stating judgment is not vacated simply when parties settle case instead of pursuing 
appeal). 
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that private litigants do not own.228 Driven by this vision, courts try to 
establish precedents that promote society’s interest. To achieve this 
result, they consult academic writings, social science evidence, and 
amicus briefs that come from different interest groups.229 This integrative 
mode of decisionmaking dilutes the relative advantage that well-to-do 
litigants would otherwise have.230 
Importantly, not all scholars are sanguine about the precedent pro-
duction process. Some of them believe that precedents are 
underproduced.231 Furthermore, Marc Galanter’s classic work showed 
that precedent production is often dominated by affluent litigants, who 
shape precedents the way they want.232 An equally important work by 
Steven Shavell identified a systematic misalignment between litigants’ 
private incentives and social good.233 This misalignment engenders 
distortions in the precedent formation process. Self-interested parties, 
unconcerned by the long-term impact of judge-made law, concentrate 
litigation efforts on issues that affect them individually; this allows 
affluent litigants more interested in precedent formation to seize the 
playfield and exert one-sided influence on court decisions.234 
Extending the proposed mechanisms beyond the realm of intellec-
tual property defenses can attenuate this problem. These mechanisms 
                                                                                                                                         
228. See Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Bancorp Mortg., 513 U.S. at 26–27 
(“Judicial precedents are presumptively correct and valuable to the legal community as a 
whole. They are not merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a 
court concludes that the public interest would be served by a vacatur.”). 
229. For a classic account, see John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: 
Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477 
(1986) (explaining development of social science research as form of authority in judicial 
opinions); see also Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 Fla. St. 
U. L. Rev. 315, 339–40 (2008) (noting importance of amicus briefs). 
230. Alas, it does not completely eliminate this advantage. 
231. See, e.g., David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 
Geo. L.J. 2619, 2623 (1995) (noting precedent production involves positive externality and 
free rider problems and private parties consequently have inadequate incentive to create 
precedent); Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U. Ill. L. 
Rev. 1043, 1114 (observing private parties have “insufficient incentive to care about the 
precedential effect on future disputes in which they are not participants”); Michael P. Van 
Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 789, 819 n.150 (2002) (“[T]he legal 
system requires the parties to bear their own litigation costs, but . . . not . . . to internalize 
the resulting learning benefits. . . . [T]he existing system may create insufficient incentives 
for an optimal amount of judicial precedent on newly created legal norms.”). 
232. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc’y Rev. 95, 97–102 (1974) (explaining how well-to-do 
parties prevail in litigating content of legal rules). 
233. See Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the 
Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. Legal Stud. 575, 577–79 (1997) (discussing 
misalignments between private and social incentives in litigation). 
234. See Galanter, supra note 232, at 101–04 (showing how affluent litigants 
dominate courts’ rulemaking). 
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are not uniquely suitable for advancement of intellectual property 
defenses. Rather, they can address a wide variety of collective action 
problems that threaten to distort the path of the law. 
C. Defendants’ Conflicts of Interest 
At times, allied defendants will find it difficult to agree about their 
litigation strategy. When this happens, the defendants’ attorney will be 
forced to engage in comprehensive trial warfare instead of settling the 
dispute. The consequent prevalence of protracted litigation is bound to 
produce inefficiencies. 
This concern is real. Admittedly, allowing the holders of intellectual 
property defenses to form alliances might create a collective action 
problem within those alliances.235 This problem might at times prevent 
the defendants from reaching a collective decision. Consequently, the 
defendants would be unable to reach a settlement agreement with the 
plaintiff. The resulting impasse would make trial, as opposed to a settle-
ment, a rule of choice for the defendants’ attorney. As a result, some 
potentially welfare-enhancing settlements would not be consummated.  
While we acknowledge this prospect, the projected increase in 
expensive trials is arguably not detrimental to society. While this increase 
is not what a welfare-driven legal system should hope for, it is much 
better than the alternative. As shown in Part II, the defendants’ failure to 
form an alliance would create an acute problem of collective inaction—a 
vulnerability that would allow intellectual property owners to target weak 
defendants and drive them into settlements that effectively obliterate the 
defense. Contrary to the famous adage, these bad settlements are not 
better than a good trial.236 Some of those settlements effectively force the 
individual defendant to surrender and not to challenge the owner’s intel-
lectual property asset. Other settlements give the defendant a privately 
beneficial deal in exchange for her abandonment of a valid defense that 
could unlock socially valuable endeavors.  
CONCLUSION 
Defenses are generally perceived as exemptions from liability that 
the law would otherwise impose. By successfully asserting a defense, a 
person avoids the normal consequences of the applicable liability rule, 
civil or criminal. This rule-exception format fosters an individualized 
view of defenses. According to this view, whether a defense is available or 
                                                                                                                                         
235. Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and 
Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 370, 398 (2000) (observing 
fragmented alliances of plaintiffs may be unmanageable). 
236. Cf. Strong v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 173 F.R.D. 167, 172 (W.D. La. 1997) 
(“In this case, I could hold my nose and accept the [suspicious class action] settlement, 
after all, it is said that a bad settlement is better than a good trial.”). 
2013] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEFENSES 1535 
  
not matters only to the person who raises it and to the plaintiff or the 
prosecutor who initiated legal proceedings against that person. Against 
this widely held view, this Article offered an analytical framework demon-
strating that not all defenses are created equal. Our analysis of intel-
lectual property law reveals that individualized defenses occupy only a 
part of the legal landscape. Other provinces are occupied by class and 
general defenses. A defendant who successfully invokes a class or general 
defense in response to an infringement claim provides a valuable service 
to multiple other parties. In the case of a class defense, the benefit 
accrues to an entire class of people who engage in a similar trade or 
activity. In the case of a general defense, the benefit flows to society as a 
whole. In both cases, the defendant relieves parties who were not yet 
sued by the intellectual property rightsholder of the duty to conform to 
the underlying right. The economic value of activities she thereby 
unlocks far exceeds her personal gain. Hence, society has a special 
interest in the vindication of class and general defenses. In light of this 
fact, one would have expected the legal system to support defendants 
who wish to raise such defenses as they act as agents for society as whole. 
At present, however, no support is forthcoming; individual defendants 
are left alone “to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”237  
One way to alleviate this problem is by allowing defendants to join 
forces with other potential defendants, so they can mount a more 
effective legal campaign together. To this end, we proposed two 
innovative procedural tools—preclusion and restitution—whose imple-
mentation would lead to far more equitable and efficient distribution of 
the costs and benefits associated with our intellectual property regime. 
There is a broader policy lesson here, however. Intellectual property 
policy analysis must not be confined to the rights side of the equation. 
The defenses side deserves as much attention. Currently, there exists 
voluminous scholarship on the benefits and costs associated with intellec-
tual property rights. The time has come to develop a more compre-
hensive understanding of the costs and benefits of intellectual property 
defenses. 
  
                                                                                                                                         
237. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (pronouncing in context of 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause). 
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